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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether a politically connected firm that operates 
in a country with an established legal system and a low perceived level of corruption can 
benefit from its connections in the form of preferential access to land. More specifically, 
the thesis examines whether the political connections of Finland’s largest retail trade 
operator S Group have been related to Finnish municipalities’ zoning decisions concerning 
the group’s ABC service station stores during the period between 1996 and 2009. I also 
analyze whether the hypothesized favorable treatment of S Group in zoning decisions is 
related to the market share of its ABC service station stores. In this thesis, a political 
connection is defined as a dual role of a member of an S Group governance organ as a 
municipal politician. As S Group consists of 21 regional cooperatives that are independent 
companies with their own management, it can be argued that the group has a relatively 
strong local presence. Due to this geographically decentralized decision making structure, 
the group can be expected to be particularly well connected to municipal politics. 
 
DATA 
 
The main dataset used in this thesis consists of S Group’s political connections from the 
period between 1996 and 2009. The main sample includes 64 ABC service station stores 
that have been pure new investments, i.e. green-field projects, and that have been built 
between 1998 and 2010. The political connections dataset is built by cross-referencing the 
names of persons who have simultaneously been members of S Group’s governance organs 
and Finnish municipal politicians from 1996 to 2010. The political connections data used 
in this study is unique, as it is manually combined from the annual reports of S Group’s 
regional cooperatives, the Statistics Finland’s election database, and by directly requesting 
data from Finnish municipalities. Additionally, data on traffic amounts from the Finnish 
Transport Agency’s database and detailed establishment level data of small grocery stores 
and service stations from the Business Register of Statistics Finland are collected to assess 
the quality of the operating locations of service stations and their competitive situation. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results show that the political connections of S Group are widespread during the entire 
examination period. However, the findings do not support the conclusion that the political 
connections of the group would have systemically affected the municipalities’ zoning 
decisions concerning ABC service station stores. The analysis shows that ABC service 
station stores are located in better operating areas than their competitors, but S Group’s 
political connections are not found to be associated with this dominance. Similarly, the 
findings do not support the conclusion that the political connections of S Group would 
have affected the market shares of its service station stores. 
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Empiirinen analyysi S-ryhmän poliittisista kytköksistä ja ABC-liikennemyymälöiden 
kaavoituspäätöksistä 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
  
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, voiko kehittyneen oikeusvaltion ja ei-
korruptoituneeksi arvioidun hallintojärjestelmän piirissä toimiva yritys hyödyntää 
poliittisia kytköksiään vaikuttaakseen toimintaansa koskeviin kaavoituspäätöksiin. 
Tutkimus toteutetaan selvittämällä, onko S-ryhmän poliittisten kytkösten ja ABC-
liikennemyymälöiden toimipaikkoja koskevien kaavoituspäätösten välillä tilastollista 
yhteyttä aikavälillä 1996–2009. Lisäksi pyritään selvittämään, sijaitsevatko ABC-
liikennemyymälät paremmilla liikepaikoilla kuin kilpailijoiden myymälät, ja onko S-
ryhmän poliittisilla kytköksillä yhteyttä näiden liikepaikkojen laatuun. Tutkimuksessa 
tarkastellaan myös, onko S-ryhmän mahdollinen suosiminen kaavoituspäätöksissä 
yhteydessä ABC-liikennemyymälöiden markkinaosuuksiin niissä kunnissa, joissa ne 
toimivat. Tässä tutkimuksessa termi poliittinen kytkös rajataan merkitsemään tilannetta, 
jossa S-ryhmän alueosuuskauppojen hallintoelimen jäsen toimii samanaikaisesti myös 
kunnallispoliitikkona. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
 
Aineisto koostuu pääosin S-ryhmän poliittisista kytköksistä ajalta 1996–2009. Pääotos 
käsittää 64 ABC-liikennemyymälää, jotka ovat olleet S-ryhmän alueosuuskauppojen 
uusinvestointeja ajalla 1998–2010. Tutkimuksessa käytetty poliittisia kytköksiä koskeva 
aineisto on ainutlaatuinen, sillä se on kerätty käsin vain tätä tutkimusta varten. Poliittisten 
kytkösten mittaamista varten kerättiin S-ryhmän edustajien sekä kunnallispoliitikkojen 
nimitiedot alueosuuskauppojen vuosikertomuksista ja Tilastokeskuksen vaalipalvelusta, 
minkä lisäksi aineistoa täydennettiin pyytämällä nimitietoja suoraan kunnilta. 
Liikenneasemien toimipaikkojen laatua tarkastellaan Liikenneviraston 
liikennemäärätilastojen avulla. Lisäksi toimialan kilpailutilannetta tarkastellaan 
Tilastokeskuksen yritysrekisterin toimipaikkatason aineistolla, josta analyysiin poimitaan 
pienet ruokakaupat ja liikennemyymälät. 
 
TULOKSET 
 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että S-ryhmän poliittiset kytkökset kunnallispolitiikkaan 
ovat laajamittaisia koko tarkasteluajanjakson ajan. Tulokset eivät kuitenkaan tue 
näkemystä, jonka mukaan poliittiset kytkökset olisivat systemaattisesti vaikuttaneet ABC-
liikennemyymälöiden kaavoituspäätöksiin. Tulokset osoittavat myös, että ABC-
liikennemyymälät sijaitsevat keskimäärin paremmilla liikepaikoilla kuin kilpailevat 
huoltoasemat, mutta näiden liikepaikkojen laatu näyttää kuitenkin olevan riippumaton 
poliittisista kytköksistä. Tulokset eivät myöskään tue näkemystä, jonka mukaan S-ryhmän 
poliittiset kytkökset olisivat vaikuttaneet ABC-liikennemyymälöiden markkinaosuuksiin.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The potentially dubious connections between business and political actors have for long 
been a topic of intense public debate in various countries. However, actual evidence is 
often limited to anecdotes and accusations in press. In Finland, these debates and media 
attention have lately focused on the zoning decisions of retail trade units. The nation’s 
largest retail operator S Group
1
, which consists of several regional cooperatives, has 
received particular attention after having opened over 400 ABC gasoline stations 
between 1998 and 2010
2
. According to the anecdotes, the penetration of the gasoline 
station network would have been accelerated by favorable treatment of the group in the 
zoning decisions of municipalities, forcing smaller players to withdraw from the market 
(see e.g. Leivonniemi 2010; Ovaskainen 2010; Ranta 2012). These claims are mainly 
based on the proposition that a significant amount of the members of the regional 
cooperatives’ governing bodies are also active in municipal politics, and would thus be 
able to influence land allocation and zoning decisions. However, this phenomenon has 
not been analyzed thoroughly, and the existence and strength of the hypothesized 
relationship remain to be investigated. 
The potential effect of S Group’s political connections on land allocation decisions 
relevant to the group is a vital question, since location is likely to be one of the major 
determinants of the profitability of operations for service stations. Thus, it can be argued 
that municipalities’ zoning decisions directly influence the competition and market 
power of single units in the service station business. In the long term, the preferential 
treatment of a specific operator in zoning decisions may skew competition and lead to 
an inefficient market. The phenomenon thus seems to be of significant economic 
importance, and motivates an analysis of whether the political connections of S Group 
are one of the driving forces behind the fast penetration of the ABC service station store 
network. Although the topic has recently been under intense scrutiny in the public, it 
seems that no academic researcher has pursued to analyze the question by taking a 
systematic empirical approach to the topic.  
                                                 
1
 Nielsen Retail Trade Register, 2012: http://fi.nielsen.com, referred 30.3.2012. 
2
 SOK annual report 2010.  
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Extant academic literature has widely recognized the importance of zoning decisions for 
businesses (see e.g. Fleischmann and Pierannunzi 1990; Hanushek and Quigley 1990; 
Blakely and Bradshaw 2002). Lubell et al. (2005) argue that businesses and developers 
have a substantial interest in land-use decisions, because land-use policy has 
consequences for the private risk and return on investments. Thus, it can be argued that 
the better operating locations businesses are allocated with, the better they are equipped 
to succeed. Due to these value creation opportunities associated with zoning decisions, 
zoning can be used as a mean for directing benefits to specific private interests (Denzau 
and Weingast 1982). The composition of zoning decision making bodies has been 
recognized to some extent affect the equality of these decisions and the fair distribution 
of benefits to different parties (see Anderson et al. 2008).  
In fact, several papers argue that zoning decisions are particularly vulnerable to political 
capture by a single interest group due to the small size and homogenous constituency of 
local decision making bodies (see e.g. Ross and Smith 1994; Ostrow 2008). If a single 
interest party manages to obtain a dominant position in the bodies relevant to zoning 
decisions, the equality of these decisions may suffer. However, other researchers show 
that the advice of professional planners dominates in zoning decision making (see e.g. 
Fleischman 1989; Burby and May 1997). Additionally, citizens’ interests are found to 
have an unambiguous effect on the outcomes of zoning decisions (Fleischmann and 
Pierrannunzi 1990). Despite this widely recognized importance of zoning decisions for 
businesses and their vulnerability to political capture, the empirical evidence on the 
political nature of these decisions is scarce and extant research is mostly focused on the 
US market.  
Although the literature on the effect of political connections of a firm on zoning 
decisions is limited, a growing amount of academic literature has pointed out that firms 
can gain from having political connections in several ways. Findings by Johnson and 
Mitton (2003), Sapienza (2004) and Faccio et al. (2006) suggest politicians often use 
their political power to grant economic favors to connected firms. However, research 
has mainly focused only on few sources of value, such as preferential access to credit 
(Dinc 2005; Charumilind et al. 2006; Claessens et al. 2008) and government aid to 
financially troubled firms (Johnson and Mitton 2003). Research on political connections 
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has also mostly concentrated on publicly listed companies (see e.g. Jayachandran 2006) 
and on developing economies (see e.g. Fisman 2001; Khwaja and Mian 2005), where 
the overall political situation is often significantly different from those of more 
developed countries. Since there is only a limited amount of existing literature on the 
sources of value of political connections and on developed economies with established 
legal systems, there is a lot of room for further research. 
The fast penetration of ABC service station stores offers a unique research setting for 
studying the link between business and politics in Finland. S Group consists of 21 
regional cooperatives, whose combined operating area covers almost all Finnish 
municipalities
3
. The regional cooperatives are governed by independent regional 
organizations
4
, being therefore more local than national or international companies. Due 
to the characteristically local presence of the regional cooperatives, their representatives 
can be expected to be more likely active in municipal politics. Political favors can also 
come in many forms, but given the significant effect of zoning decisions on the 
competitive landscape of the service station business, preferential access to land is a 
likely candidate. Of the potential channels through which political connections can pay 
off, access to land has been empirically analyzed only to a limited extent. So far, only 
anecdotal claims have hinted at the possibility of S Group’s preferential access to land. 
This thesis evaluates these claims empirically.  
1.2 Research questions and contribution of the thesis 
The purpose of my thesis is to study how the political connections of a firm are related 
to (1) the zoning and land allocation decisions concerning its units and to (2) its market 
power. Specifically, I aim to examine the political connections of S Group and the 
expansion of its ABC service station store network. My research question is two-fold 
and is summarized as follows: 
(1) Can politically connected firms benefit from their political connections by 
receiving preferential access to land? 
                                                 
3
 S Group, 2012: www.sok.fi, referred 1.4.2012. 
4
 S Group, 2012: www.sok.fi, referred 1.4.2012. 
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(2) Do politically connected firms have higher market shares in municipalities 
where the political connections are stronger? 
In Section 4, these two research questions are discussed more comprehensively and 
divided into four more specific sub-questions to analyze the presented topic from 
various standpoints. 
My thesis contributes to the existing body of corporate governance related research by 
focusing on the value creation effects of firms’ political connections. Specifically, it 
contributes to the literature on the relationship between firms’ political connections and 
zoning decisions relevant to its operations. This thesis also adds to the relatively small 
amount of literature on the political connections of firms that focuses on developed 
markets with established legal systems. Moreover, my thesis explores the quality of 
corporate governance in Finland from a previously unexplored standpoint and focuses 
on a specific subject that has important economic implications on its own. Regarding 
the methodology of this thesis, I believe I am the first researcher to conduct a 
comprehensive empirical investigation of the relationship between S Group’s political 
connections and zoning decisions concerning its ABC service station stores. 
The findings of this thesis do not support the conclusion that the political connections of 
S Group’s regional cooperatives would have systematically affected the expansion of 
the group’s ABC service station store network. The group’s connections to municipal 
councils, municipal boards and committees relevant to construction and zoning 
decisions are not found to be related to municipalities’ zoning decisions concerning 
ABC service station stores. The service station stores of the group are located in better 
operating areas than their competitors on average, but the political connections of the 
group are not statistically significantly associated with this dominance. Moreover, the 
market share of ABC service station stores is not found to be related to the group’s 
political connections. Overall, the findings of my thesis do not support the claims of the 
causality between S Group’s political connections and zoning decisions concerning the 
group’s service station stores.  
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1.3 Research scope, methods and limitations 
I undertake a systematic examination of the link between S Group’s political 
connections and zoning decisions of ABC service station stores. Additionally, I analyze 
the relationship between S Group’s political connections and the market power of ABC 
service station stores. I pursue to analyze the political connections of the group using 
data of the Finnish municipal politicians and S Group representatives during the period 
between 1996 and 2009. My sample covers 64 ABC service station stores that are pure 
new investments
5
. With some limitations the sample includes all pure new investment 
ABC service station stores that were opened by regional cooperatives by the end of 
2010.  
To analyze the political connections of S Group, I compile a unique panel dataset by 
collecting the names of S Group representatives and municipal politicians. To identify 
the group of individuals that are politically connected, I cross-reference the names of 
municipal politicians with the names of S Group representatives. Several measurements 
are employed to assess the strength of political connections in a certain area, such as the 
relative number of connected municipal councilors and the share of votes received by 
S Group’s representatives in municipal elections. The relationship between zoning 
decisions and political connections is analyzed by using Probit regression analysis and 
cross-tabulation. The association between political connections and market power is 
analyzed by using OLS regression analysis.  
The first limitation of my thesis relates to the identification of political connections. I 
cross-reference the names of S Group and municipal representatives based on the first 
and last name seeking exact match. As discussed in Khwaja and Mian (2005), it should 
be noted that this literal matching of names can lead to two types of errors: (I) incorrect 
exclusion and (II) false inclusion. The first type of error arises when an S Group 
representative is politically connected, but my algorithm is unable to match him/her to a 
name in my dataset of municipal politicians. For example, different spellings of names 
or name changes due to e.g. marriage may lead to that a representative will not be 
matched. The second type of error occurs when my algorithm matches an S Group 
                                                 
5
 In this thesis, the expression pure new investment is used to refer to a green-field service station store 
investment as opposed to acquired and previously owned units, which have been renovated and 
transferred under the ABC brand. 
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representative to a municipal politician, but the match is incorrect. For example, 
different people may share the same first and last names. However, Aigner (1973) 
shows that this measurement error produces lower estimates of the true effect when the 
independent variable is binary. As my main measures for political connections are 
constructed as binary variables, the results of this thesis are likely to underestimate the 
true relationship between political connections, zoning decisions, and market share. 
Another limitation related to the identification of political connections is that I am 
unable to track all the changes in the composition of S Group and municipal decision 
making organs during official office terms. These changes increase noise in regressions 
and cause attenuation bias to my results. Similar to the limitations in the matching 
process of names, the attenuation bias should affect the results so that the true 
relationship between the analyzed factors is underestimated.  
The second limitation stems from the relatively small number of ABC service station 
stores that have been pure new investments. To obtain reliable results from the cross-
tabulations and Probit regression analyses where the dependent variable is binary, the 
sample needs to include enough of both types of observations. The value of the binary 
variable mostly used in the empirical tests of this thesis depends on whether an ABC 
service station store has been opened in a municipality during the observation year or 
not. The amount of observation years of the former type is relatively low in some of my 
regression specifications, which complicates the interpretation of the results. I am also 
unable to determine the exact plan approval dates for all ABC service station stores, and 
thus assume that all units are planned in same timeframe as the units for whom I am 
able to detect the correct plan approval date.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
I have organized the rest of the thesis as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional 
setting of the thesis giving an overview of S Group and its service station business, as 
well as describes the Finnish municipal administrative system. I conclude the section by 
discussing different ways through which political connections may create value in 
zoning and land allocation decisions. Section 3 presents the main findings of previous 
research on firms’ political connections and zoning decision making. The section also 
sheds light on the limited body of existing research on the expansion of the ABC service 
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station store network. Section 4 presents the research questions of this thesis. After that, 
the methods and data used in the empirical part of the thesis are described in Section 5. I 
present and analyze the results from the empirical part in Section 6. Finally, I conclude 
by summarizing the main findings of the thesis and providing suggestions for further 
research in Section 7.  
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2 Institutional setting 
This section provides an overview of the institutional setting of my study. First, I give 
an overview of S Group’s operations, administration, and decision making structure. 
This overview section is directly based on information published on S Group’s website6 
unless indicated otherwise. After that, I briefly describe the political organization of 
Finnish municipalities. Finally, I discuss the zoning process to illustrate the ways 
through which municipal politicians could affect the outcomes of the zoning decision 
making.  
2.1  Overview of S Group 
S Group is a Finnish network of companies in the retail and service trades with a total of 
1,600 outlets in Finland. The group consists of regional cooperatives, local 
cooperatives, the central firm SOK and its subsidiaries.
 
The regional cooperative 
structure was established in the 1980s, when many smaller locally operating 
cooperatives merged into larger cooperatives, which are today referred to as regional 
cooperatives. In 2012, the group’s cooperative network consists of 21 regional 
cooperatives and eight smaller local cooperatives, which together cover the whole of 
Finland. S Group provides services in the trades of grocery and consumer goods, service 
stations and fuels, tourism and hospitality, automobile and auto accessories and in the 
agricultural trade. In 2010, S Group had 39,646 employees and generated net retail sales 
of 10,465 million euros
7
. The group is one of the two major retail trade operators in 
Finland. In 2010, the group’s market share in the Finnish retail trade market amounted 
to 44% whereas the market share of the second largest operator was 35%
8
.  
Founded in 1904, SOK operates as the central firm for the cooperatives and produces 
procurement, expert and support services for them. SOK is also in charge of S Group's 
strategic steering and the development of the group’s chains. SOK operates in the 
supermarket, tourism and hospitality trades in Finland as well as in the Baltic area and 
St. Petersburg. SOK is owned by the cooperatives: the ownership stake in SOK held by 
                                                 
6
 S Group, 2012: www.sok.fi. All the references were done 1.3.2012. 
7
 SOK annual report 2010. VAT not included in the net retail sales. 
8
 Nielsen Retail Trade Register, 2012: http://fi.nielsen.com, referred 30.3.2012. 
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a cooperative is based on the number of members of a cooperative and the amount of its 
purchases from SOK's subsidiaries.  
In addition to SOK, S Group consists of two types of cooperatives: regional and local 
cooperatives. The local cooperatives operate locally and are smaller than the regional 
ones, whose operating areas cover several municipalities. S Group’s cooperatives are 
independent companies that operate on a cooperative basis. According to the Finnish 
law, the purpose of cooperatives is to support the members’ economy by producing 
benefits and services for them
9
. In the organization structure of S Group the function of 
the group’s cooperatives is to produce services and benefits for their customer owners 
within their own operational region, mainly in outlets belonging to national chains of 
the group. Most of S Group’s business operations are conducted by the group’s regional 
cooperatives that are independently in charge of their business operations. Both types of 
cooperatives are independent companies with their own management; therefore the 
operations of S Group’s cooperatives have a particularly strong regional emphasis. The 
cooperatives are owned by their customer members: S Group had 1.9 million customer 
members in 2010, which represents 77% of Finnish households
10
. Figure 1 describes S 
Group’s administration and group structure11. 
                                                 
9
 Co-operatives Act (1488/2001), Chapter 1 Section 2. 
10
 SOK annual report 2010. 
11
 Figure 1 is adapted from the S Group website: www.sok.fi, referred 1.3.2012. 
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Figure 1 S Group’s organisation structure 
 
2.1.1 Administration and decision making in S Group 
According to S Group, the administrative and control systems of the regional 
cooperatives are based on the Finnish Cooperative Act, other relevant legislation, 
cooperative rules and regulations as well as general corporate governance codes. The 
central administrative bodies of the regional cooperatives are their council of 
representatives, supervisory board, board of directors and managing director. The 
highest decision making body is the council of representatives. Figure 2 illustrates the 
administration and management structure of the regional cooperatives
12
.
 
The following 
discussion focuses on the functions and roles of each of these decision making bodies in 
the organization structure of regional cooperatives, and is based on the information 
provided by the corporate governance statements of the regional cooperatives
13
 and S 
Group website unless indicated otherwise. 
                                                 
12
 Figure 2 is adapted from Osuuskauppa Hämeenmaa corporate governance statement 2012. 
13
 Note: Not all regional cooperatives publish their corporate governance statements and therefore, the 
practices between regional cooperatives and the description presented here may differ in some details. 
The main governance structure still is harmonized between the regional cooperatives.  
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Figure 2 Administration structure of regional cooperatives 
 
Council of representatives 
The council of representatives uses the owner’s highest decision making power. Of the 
individual matters under the council's power of decision, the most important ones 
include changes in the rules and any possible decisions concerning mergers or the 
closing down of the cooperative's operations. The council of representatives assembles 
according to what is defined in the cooperative's rules. Typically, the council holds two 
assemblies per year, one in spring and one in autumn.  
The council of representatives is not a mandatory body in a cooperative. In large 
cooperatives it replaces the cooperative meeting. In 2012, only Jukolan Osuuskauppa 
does not have a council of representatives
14
. The council of representatives is chosen 
through an election every four years. Every cooperative member who is over 15 years 
old has the right to vote in the election. Any customer member of a cooperative who is 
over 18 years old can in turn run for election. The number of members in the council of 
representatives varies between regional cooperatives. The largest representative council 
comprises 100 members whereas the smallest councils consist of a couple of dozen 
members
15
. The members of council of representatives are entitled to compensation. For 
                                                 
14
 S Group, 2012: www.sok.fi, referred 10.3.2012. 
15
 Annual reports of the regional cooperatives 2009. 
Customer owners
Council of Representatives
(not mandatory)
Supervisory Board
Managing Director
Board of Directors
Source: See footnote 12 p.10 
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instance, the members of the council of representatives of Helsingin Osuuskauppa 
Elanto, the largest regional cooperative, are compensated with 425 euros for each 
meeting they attend
16
. 
Supervisory board 
The Finnish Cooperatives Act does not require a cooperative to have a supervisory 
board. However, in S Group the cooperatives’ rules define it as part of the 
administrative model. According to the corporate governance statements of the regional 
cooperatives, the supervisory board is granted with a significantly higher level of power 
in regional cooperatives than in publicly listed companies
17
. The supervisory board 
focuses on supervision-related questions and selects the members of the board of 
directors. The central responsibilities of a supervisory board typically consist of 
supervision of business operations, election of the board of directors and managing 
directors, confirmation of the strategy and annual financial objectives as well as 
decisions regarding significant mergers or demerger of a cooperative. 
The number of members in the supervisory boards of the cooperatives varies around 20 
persons. In addition to the members elected by the representative council, 
representatives of employees also have seats on the supervisory board. The corporate 
governance statements of regional cooperatives set several requirements for the 
members of supervisory boards
18
. First, a member of a board of directors cannot be a 
member in a supervisory board. Second, members of a supervisory board are required to 
have appropriate knowledge of business and administrative procedures. The entire 
operating area of a regional cooperative should also be represented as equally as 
possible by the supervisory board members. Additionally, the members are required to 
live in the operating area of the regional cooperative. The supervisory board assembles 
when the chairman summons a meeting. The members of supervisory boards are 
entitled to a compensation, which varies between different positions on the board. For 
instance, the members of the supervisory board of Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto were 
                                                 
16
 Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto corporate governance statement 2012. 
17
 See e.g Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto corporate governance statement 2012. 
18
 See e.g Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto corporate governance statement 2012. 
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compensated with approximately 2,000 to 3,000 euros in 2011, whereas the Chairman 
of the supervisory board was compensated with 32,680 euros
19
. 
Board of directors 
In the regional cooperatives, the board of directors is responsible for the success of the 
cooperative’s business operations. The board of directors decides the central strategy 
and objectives, makes investment decisions, sets annual financial objectives and 
operation plans as well as leads and supervises operational activities. In the regional 
cooperatives, the managing director is also a member of board of directors. The 
managing director is responsible for managing the operations of the cooperative in 
accordance with the decisions and instructions of the administrative bodies.  
The board of directors consists of a cooperative-specific number of members elected for 
a period of one calendar year. The amount of board members typically varies between 
four and six. Differently to publicly listed companies, the board of directors is selected 
by the supervisory board, not by the annual general meeting. According to the corporate 
governance statements of the regional cooperatives, the members of boards of directors 
should have appropriate business and administrative knowledge and live in the 
operating area of the regional cooperative when possible. The board of directors 
meeting is called together when necessary, but a specified minimum amount of 
meetings must be held. The members of boards of directors are also entitled to 
compensation. For instance, in 2011 the members of Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto’s 
board of directors, excluding the managing director who is the chairman of the board, 
received compensations that varied between 18,715 and 27,080 euros
20
. 
2.1.2 Service station and fuel trade 
In 2010, S Group's service station and fuel trade network consisted of 108 ABC service 
stations stores, 280 ABC unmanned stations and 17 ABC-Delis and 12 other gasoline 
stations
21
. Before establishing the ABC service station chain in 1998, S Group was 
already active in the fuel and service station business. The regional cooperatives had 
                                                 
19
 Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto corporate governance statement 2012. 
20
 Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto corporate governance statement 2012. 
21
 SOK annual report 2010. 
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gasoline stations which operated under the brands of oil companies. In 1996, Shell was 
the most significant partner whose share of the partner units was 62%
22
.  
At the end of 1990s, S Group decided to establish the ABC service and gasoline station 
chain that would operate under the group’s own logo. The first ABC service station 
store was opened in Utti, Valkeala in December 1998. Currently, all of the service 
station stores belong to the regional cooperatives, although a few of them were 
originally opened by local cooperatives. These stations have become part of the regional 
cooperatives through mergers between local and regional cooperatives
23
. 
The ABC service station stores are often large service station units that in addition to 
selling fuel, have a supermarket store, a restaurant and often also other services, such as 
a pharmacy and an Alko liquor store
24
. In Finland, the latter is a regulated type of retail 
store operated by the state alcohol monopoly. One of the largest ABC service station 
stores is ABC Kuortti located in Pertunmaa. Its total surface consists of 3,200m
2
 of 
which 2,700m
2
 belongs to restaurant and grocery stores of ABC, and the rest is divided 
between an Alko store, a pharmacy, souvenir and leather stores. (Mäntylä et al. 2011.) 
In 2009, 1.2 billion euros of the net sales of S Group’s service station and fuel trade was 
generated through fuel trade, and 500 million euros from restaurant and grocery store 
services (Alkio 2010). 
The number of ABC service stations stores grew at a compounded annual growth rate of 
30% between 1999 and 2010
25
. The fastest growth year was 2004 during which S Group 
opened 21 ABC service stations stores. However, all ABC service stations stores were 
not pure new investments since several of the group’s existing fuel and service stations 
were renovated to fit into the ABC concept. The regional cooperatives also acquired 
competing service stations, which were then turned into ABC stations. In 2006, S Group 
acquired ExxonMobil's fuel marketing affiliate Esso Finland (SOK 2006a). As a result 
of the transaction, part of the existing Esso stations joined to the ABC chain and the rest 
were sold to the St1-chain (SOK 2006b). The deal increased the amount of S Group's 
ABC gasoline stations particularly in the Greater Helsinki area and in Southern 
                                                 
22
 SOK annual report 1996. 
23
 See e.g. Osuuskauppa Hämeenmaa press release 18.2.2011. 
24
 SOK annual report 2010. 
25
 Calculation is based on SOK annual reports 1999-2010. 
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Finland
26
. The goal of the ABC chain is to continue to implement a growth strategy, 
although the approach will be a bit more moderate than in the previous years. New 
service station stores will likely be established at a rate of five to eight units per year.
 27
 
Figure 3 illustrates the growth of the ABC service station store network
28
. 
Figure 3 Number of ABC service station stores and the chain’s market share  
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, ABC’s market share in fuel trade has grown steadily with the 
expansion of the service station store network. In 1999, the group’s market share in fuel 
trade was 12%. By the end of 2010 the chain’s market share had already reached 27%29. 
In 2010, ABC chain was the market leader in the gasoline trade, leaving the former 
market leader Neste Oil to the second place. Table 1 provides an overview of the most 
important operators in the Finnish gasoline station market
30
. Measured by the share of 
gasoline sales, ABC chain was the market leader in the Finnish gasoline station market 
in 2010. The second largest gasoline seller Neste Oil had the most extensive gasoline 
station network with its 515 stations.  
                                                 
26
 SOK annual report 2006. 
27
 SOK annual report 2010. 
28
 Figure 3: The number of ABC service station stores is based on the year-end number reported in SOK 
annual reports for the years 2001-2010. For the years 1998-2000 the number is based on the sum of new 
stations opened, as the year-end number is not reported. Thus, I make the assumption that no service 
stations were closed in 1999-2000. 
29
 SOK annual report 2010. 
30
 Finnish Petroleum Federation, 2012: www.oil.fi/eng, referred 10.3.2012. Note: The definition of 
service station includes also other units that S Group reports as service station stores thus, the number is 
higher than the number reported by S Group in 2010.  
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Table 1 Operators in the Finnish gasoline station market 
 
2.2 Finnish municipal administrative system 
Next, I describe the Finnish municipal administrative system and review the functions 
of the municipal decision making bodies. The Finnish local authorities are responsible 
for a particularly wide variety of duties. In fact, Finnish municipalities are responsible 
for organising the majority of public services provided to citizens. The statutory duties 
of the municipalities are laid down by the Local Government Act. The most important 
statutory functions are social welfare, healthcare, education, environmental protection 
and technical infrastructure. (Sjöblom 2010.)  
The administration of municipalities is based on the self-government of their residents, 
and therefore municipalities can organise their administration relatively freely. In 
Finland each municipality must have a municipal council, which is the main decision 
making body, a municipal board, an auditing committee for auditing municipal 
administration and finance, and an election committee, which is responsible for 
organizing elections. Other committees elected by municipal council such as education, 
zoning and social committees are optional and the structure of the committee 
organization varies greatly between municipalities. (Sjöblom 2010.) Municipalities 
must also have a municipal manager, elected by the municipal council
31
. Figure 4 
                                                 
31
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 24. 
Operator / Chain
Service 
stations
Unmanned 
stations
Total
Share of 
gasoline sales
Share of diesel 
sales
ABC 125 280 405 28% 11%
Neste Oil 310 205 515 25% 39%
Seo 94 83 177 3% 2%
Shell / St1 Energy 158 50 208 13% 12%
St1 89 256 345 14% 9%
Teboil 139 196 335 18% 27%
Others 0% 0%
Total 915 1,070 1,985 100% 100%
This table describes the distribution of service stations and unmanned fuel stations in Finland on 31
st
 December 2010 by 
operator / chain. The table also describes the market shares in gasoline and diesel trade in 2010. 
Note: St1 acquired Shell's operations in Finland in 2010. Starting from 1
st 
December 2010, Shell units have operated under 
St1 Energy Oy.
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illustrates the administration structure of Finnish municipalities as laid down by the 
Local Government Act
32
.  
Figure 4 The Finnish municipal administrative system 
 
 
Municipal council 
Municipal council is the main decision making body in the Finnish municipal 
administrative system. According to the Finnish Local Government Act, the municipal 
council is responsible for municipal operations and finance. The duties of municipal 
council laid down by the act are illustrated in Table 2.
 33
 
                                                 
32
 Figure 4 is adapted from the website of the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities: 
www.localfinland.fi, referred 1.3.2012. 
33
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 2 Section 13. 
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Table 2 Duties of municipal council 
 
The municipal council is elected by the municipality’s residents for the four calendar 
years following the election year
34
. In the municipal elections of 2008, in total 10,412 
municipal councilors were elected
35
. The number of elected municipal councilors is 
proportional to the population of the municipality, varying from 17 to 85 councilors 
with exceptions allowed for smaller municipalities
36
. For the office term 2009-2012, the 
most common municipal council size is 27 members, and on average municipalities 
have 31 councilors. Approximately 35% of the elected councilors had not been 
members of the municipal councils in the terms 2005-2008 and 2009-2012.
37
 
Other organs under municipal council 
In addition to the municipal council, the Finnish Local Government Act requires 
municipalities to have a municipal board appointed by the municipal council
38
. The 
members of the municipal board are not required to be elected councilors
39
. The 
municipal board is responsible for municipality’s day-to-day administration, financial 
management, and for preparing, executing and watching over the legality of council 
                                                 
34
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 2 Section 9. 
35
 The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, 2012: www.localfinland.fi, referred 
14.4.2012. 
36
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 2 Section 10. 
37
 The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, 2012: www.localfinland.fi, referred 
14.4.2012. 
38
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 17. 
39
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 18. 
Duties of municipal council
(1) Decides on the main operational and financial objectives
(2) Decides on the principles for arranging the administration
(3) Decides on financial principles, financing and investment, and approves the budget
(4) Decides on the general principles for the charges to be collected for services and other performances
(5) Decides on the operational and financial targets to be set for a municipal enterprise
(6) Decides whether to provide a guarantee or other security for another party's debt
(7) Elects members to municipal organs, unless otherwise provided
(8) Decides on the principles for the financial remunerations of elected officials
(9) Elects auditors
(10) Approves the financial statements and decides whether to grant release from liability
(11) Decides on other matters provided and appointed for decision by the council
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decisions
40
. The responsibilities of the municipal board are more practical than those of 
the council. Municipalities are also required to have a municipal manager who works 
under the municipal board as the head of municipal administration, financial 
management and other operations
41
.
 
 
Moreover, the municipal management system features committees, which operate under 
the municipal board. The municipal council selects the committees, which oversee the 
provision of public services in the municipality and perform the permanent duties 
assigned by the municipal council.
42
 The most common committees are the education 
committee, social welfare and health committee and zoning committee. The number and 
responsibilities of the committees vary between municipalities.
43 
Similar to the 
municipal board the members are not required to be elected councilors
44
. 
2.3 Zoning process 
In Finland, municipalities have a central role in zoning since they draft their own local 
land use plans, which must be approved by the municipal council
45
. Thus local 
authorities and municipal politicians act as decision-makers and coordinators in the 
zoning processes. They have a significant amount of control over the building and 
zoning decisions in their municipalities. The main instruments for the local authorities 
are the local master plan, the local detailed plan, and the permitting system of the 
building legislation. In this section I give an overview of the zoning process to illustrate 
how political connections may increase value in zoning and permit decisions.  
2.3.1 Process description 
The provisions of the Land Use and Building Act are applied in the zoning, building 
development and use of land and water areas
46
. The Land Use and Building Act gives 
local authorities significant responsibility for zoning and building control within their 
area. In fact, Finland’s land use planning system provides municipalities with a high 
                                                 
40
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 23. 
41
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 24. 
42
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 17. 
43
 Finland’s Ministry of Finance, 2010: Finnish public governance – A background report. 
44
 Local Government Act (365/1995), Chapter 3 Section 18. 
45
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 5 Section 37 and Chapter 7 Section 52. 
46
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 1 Section 2. 
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degree of autonomy in local land use planning
47
. The local authorities have the so-called 
municipal monopoly in statutory land use zoning, meaning that local authorities have, 
besides the responsibility, also the right to control statutory land use and zoning within 
their municipality (Nuuja and Viitanen 2007).  
The Finnish zoning system consists of four levels of zoning: national objectives of land-
use planning, regional plans, local master plans and local detailed plans. The regional 
plan acts as a set of guidelines for lower level planning, which includes local master 
plans and local detailed plans. (Nuuja and Viitanen 2007.) Land use in municipalities is 
organized and steered by local master plans and local detailed plans. The local master 
plan indicates the general principles of land use in the municipality. The local detailed 
plan indicates how land-areas within a municipality are used and built.
48
  
(1) Local master plans cover community structure and land use. The purpose of 
the local master plan is to lay out the general principles of the community 
structure and land use of a municipality. The local master plan allocates areas for 
different land uses such as housing, traffic, services and recreation.
49
 When the 
local master plan is drafted, the regional plan must be taken into account
50
. The 
local master plan is approved by the municipal council
51
. 
(2) Local detailed plans control construction and indicate how land-areas within 
the municipality are used and built. According to law, the local detailed plan is 
drawn up for the purpose of organizing land use, construction and development in 
detail. Local detailed plans determine the characteristics of local neighborhoods, 
covering land uses and all types of construction. The locations and sizes of 
buildings are also defined in detail. Plans may cover whole districts or only a 
single property.
52
 When the local detailed plan is drafted, the regional plan and the 
local master plan must be taken into account
53
. The local detailed plan is approved 
                                                 
47
 Finland’s Ministry of the Environment, 2005: Regional land use planning in Finland.  
48
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 1 Section 4. 
49
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 5 Section 35. 
50
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 5 Section 39. 
51
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 5 Section 37. 
52
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 7 Section 50. 
53
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 7 Section 54. 
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by the municipal council. When the impact of the plan is minor, the municipal 
council’s authority may be delegated to the municipal board or to a committee.54 
The zoning process consists of several stages, whose content depend on the nature and 
significance of the zoning project. The following description is based on the general 
zoning process description presented by Finland’s Ministry of the Environment55.  
(1) Starting stage: The initiative for a zoning process can come from a landowner, 
an inhabitant or different administrative actors of the municipality. Preceding the 
actual zoning the local authority conducts an assessment of the need and 
requirements for a statutory land use plan. The assessment procedure is conducted 
both in the context of local master and local detailed plans. If the municipality 
considers the project appropriate, the zoning begins with the preparation of the 
participation and assessment scheme. The scheme covers participation and 
interaction procedures as well as an assessment of the impact of the plan. The 
initiation of the zoning process must be publicized so that interested parties have 
the opportunity to obtain information on the principles of the zoning and on the 
participation and assessment procedure. 
(2) Preparation stage: The plan draft is prepared according to the participation 
and assessment scheme. The plan draft describes the preliminary purposes of use 
of the planned area and the amount and location of buildings. The plan draft is 
published according to the participation and assessment scheme. Residents have 
the right to express their opinion on the published plan draft.  
(3) Proposal stage: From the basis of the plan draft and expressed opinions the 
plan proposal is finalized. The plan proposal is presented in public. Members of 
the municipality and interested parties are provided with an opportunity to express 
their opinion on the matter. On the local level, the plan proposal is usually first 
considered in the administrative bodies (committee or municipal board) before it 
is formally published. For instance, in Helsinki the plan proposal is presented to 
the city zoning committee. The plan proposal supported by the committee is 
                                                 
54
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 7 Section 52. 
55
 See Tulkki and Vehmas, 2007. Environmental Administration Guidelines 1/2007. 
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presented in public. A citizen who is not content with the proposal can express his 
opinion in written form.
56
 
(4) Approval stage: If no complaints are received the plan proposal is approved. 
The local master plans and local detailed plans are approved by the municipal 
council. When the local detailed plan does not have significant impact the plan 
can also be approved by the municipal board or a committee.  
Rinkinen (2007) reports the results of the Ministry of the Environment and the 
Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities’ analysis of the duration of the 
local detailed plan process in 54 municipalities between 2004 and 2005. They find that 
the median duration of the zoning process was 10.3 months for the whole sample and 
9.9 months for large municipalities. These results are relevant for later empirical 
analysis and especially for constructing the lags used in the regression models in 
Section 6 of this thesis. 
2.3.2 Other permits required  
Service stations also require building and environmental permits. A building permit is 
required for the construction of a building. A building permit is also required for repair 
and alteration work that is comparable to building construction and for extending a 
building or increasing its gross floor area. To receive a permit, the project needs to be in 
line with the local detailed plan if the building is constructed in its area.
57
 The municipal 
building supervision authority approves building permits
58
. 
According to the Finnish Environmental Protection Act, an environmental permit is 
required for fuel stations and for the distribution of liquid fuels when specific limits are 
exceeded
59
. The environmental permits are also approved on the municipal level. For 
instance, in Helsinki the environmental permits are usually approved by a special 
environmental committee
60
. 
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 City of Helsinki, 2012a: Planning procedures. 
57
 Land Use and Building Act (132/1999), Chapter 18 Section 125. 
58
 Land Use and Building Decree (895/1999), Chapter 1 Section 4. 
59
 Environmental Protection Decree (169/2000), Chapter 1 Section 1. 
60
 City of Helsinki, 2012b: Functions of environmental committee. 
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3 Literature review 
In this section I first present a brief overview of existing academic research on the value 
creation effects of political connections of firms and the possible means through which 
political connections can create value for politically connected firms. After that I 
present literature on zoning decision making and its political aspects. Finally, I conclude 
the section by presenting the limited body of literature on the effects of ABC service 
station stores on their operating environment. Due to the limited amount of extant 
research on the ABC service station stores, I also shortly discuss a report published by 
interest groups representing Finnish fuel retailers
61
 that analyzes the political 
connections of S Group and their implications on the land allocation decisions 
concerning S Group’s units.  
3.1 Value creation through political connections 
Granovetter (1985) argues that even in modern capitalist societies, social networks, 
including political connections, are a significant determinant of resource allocation and 
other economic actions. Several recent academic studies provide supportive evidence 
for this argument by showing that political connections can create value to companies 
(see e.g. Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006). The academic literature provides evidence for that 
this enhancement of firm value may stem from multiple sources, such as access to bank 
financing (Johnson and Mitton 2003), government subsidies (Faccio et al. 2006) and 
allocation of procurement contracts (Goldmann et al. 2010). These value creation 
opportunities associated to political connections may inspire firms to become politically 
connected (Jiang 2008). 
Faccio (2006) studies the relationship between political connections and share prices by 
examining over 20,000 firms in 47 economies. In his study, Faccio defines political 
connections as at least one large shareholder or top officer being a member of 
parliament, a minister, or closely related to a top politician or party. His results suggest 
that appointments of politicians to corporate boards have no significant effect on stock 
prices, even though such connections are widespread. However, he finds that the stock 
                                                 
61
 The report was written for the Federation of Finnish Enterprises (Suomen Yrittäjät), the Association of 
Finnish Fuel Retailers (Suomen Bensiinikauppiaitten ja Liikennepalvelualojen Liitto SBL ry) and the 
Foundation for Retail Trade Research (Vähittäiskaupan tutkimussäätiö). 
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prices of firms tend to increase significantly when a businessperson representing the 
firm enters politics. Fisman (2001) finds that the market values of Indonesian firms are 
significantly associated with the changes in the political landscape. Claessens et al. 
(2008) analyze the value of political connections in the Brazilian market. Their results 
show that the firms that provided contributions to federal deputies around the 1998 and 
2002 elections experienced higher stock returns than firms that did not do so. However, 
as Faccio reports, political connections are less common in the presence of more 
stringent regulation of political conflicts of interest, thus the results from less developed 
countries and cross-country studies cannot as such be generalized to countries with 
established legal systems and lower perceived levels of corruption. 
A few papers focus on analyzing the value of political connections in the developed 
countries by providing evidence on the US stock market. Goldman et al. (2009) find 
that the US firms that announced a board nomination of a politically connected director 
experienced a positive abnormal stock return. Moreover, they reports that the companies 
connected to the Republican Party increased in value in response to the Republican 
victory in the 2000 Presidential Elections. Fisman et al. (2006) and Jayachandran (2006) 
also analyze the effects of political connections in the US market, but instead of 
systemic effects they focus on the impact of political connections to single politicians. 
Jayachandran finds that firms lost 0.8% of their market capitalization during the week 
that Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party for every $250,000 they gave to 
Republicans in the previous election cycle. Fisman et al., who analyze the market value 
of personal ties to Vice-President Cheney, present somewhat contrary evidence. Their 
results show that the value of ties to Cheney is zero, indicating that political connections 
would not create value to the US firms. They present that media scrutiny prevents 
highly placed public officials in the United States from favoring those with whom they 
have personnel connections. Although these studies deal with the important question of 
whether companies can benefit from having political connections, they mostly remain 
silent in the area of the exact source of this value.   
Even though the channels for political influence are likely to be multifold, previous 
academic studies that report evidence on the sources of value of connections are 
relatively limited to certain types of benefits. Most of previous studies have analyzed 
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preferential access to credit (Johnson and Mitton 2003; Khwaja and Mian 2005), 
regulatory protection (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998) and government aid to financially 
troubled firms (Faccio et al. 2006).  
Various papers that pursue to examine the channels for political influence are focused 
on analyzing whether politically connected firms are favored in credit decisions in 
developing economies. Several studies suggest that politically connected firms are 
associated with preferential access to bank financing. For instance, Khwaja and Mian 
(2005) show that companies in Pakistan with political connections receive more loans 
and default on these loans at a much higher rate relative to unconnected companies, 
providing evidence that these loans are granted based on political considerations. 
Charumilind et al. (2006) provide similar evidence for lending practices in Thailand. 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) argue that Indonesian firms with political ties often 
receive cheap loans from state-owned banks and are therefore less likely to use foreign 
capital markets as their financing source. Claessens et al. (2008) find that firms which 
provided financial support to candidates in the federal elections of 1998 and 2002 in 
Brazil significantly increased their bank financing relative to a control group. To 
conclude, evidence from several developing economies suggests that politically 
connected firms are favored in credit decisions, but again such research on developed 
economies is scarce.  
In addition to preferential access to debt financing, a handful of other ways how 
political connections can pay off have also been identified. Inter alia, Goldman et al. 
(2010) examine a sample of US firms around the 1994 and the 2000 elections and 
provide evidence that politically connected firms are more likely to experience an 
increase in government procurement contracts when they are connected to the winning 
party. Faccio et al. (2006) analyze the likelihood of government bailouts by using a 
sample of 450 publicly listed and politically connected firms from 35 countries over the 
period 1997 through 2002. They find that politically connected firms are significantly 
more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected firms and the likelihood 
increases if the IMF or World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm’s home 
government. Faccio (2007) analyzes the characteristics of politically connected firms in 
a cross-country study of 47 countries. His cross-country analysis suggests that firms 
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connected through their owners enjoy significantly lower taxation than unconnected 
firms. 
The literature presented here has managed to widely validate the value creation 
opportunities associated to political connections and identify a few means through 
which these connections can bring benefits for politically connected firms. However, 
the consequences of these connections on market competition have received 
surprisingly little attention. The most direct attempt to capture the effect of political 
connections on market competition seems to be the cross-country analysis by Faccio 
(2007). He finds particularly strong evidence on that politically connected firms are 
associated with significantly higher market shares than non-connected firms. According 
to Faccio, the stronger market power of more connected firms proxies for monopolies, 
government contracts and protection in general.  
To conclude, it seems evident that political connections can provide firms with various 
types of benefits. However, research has so far focused only on a relatively limited body 
of candidates for potential sources of such value. Additionally, academic studies have 
been mainly carried out through cross-country analyses and by focusing on developing 
economies. In this thesis, I contribute to existing research by focusing on zoning 
decisions as a source of value from political connection. My study also analyzes the 
phenomenon within Finland, which is a developed economy with an established legal 
system and a low perceived level of corruption. In 2011, Finland was ranked as the 
second least corrupted country in the world
62
. 
3.2 Decision making in zoning process 
The importance of zoning decisions in the economic development of communities is 
widely recognized in existing literature. The importance of these decisions is likely to 
stem from that zoning can be seen as the primary means for regulating and coordinating 
land use (Ostrow 2008). Through zoning local governments can influence the 
development, usefulness, and distribution of their land (Oliver 2001). Hanushek and 
Quigley (1990) describe land-use rules as the most significant market intervention taken 
by state and local governments. Furthermore, zoning decisions have also been shown to 
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have an impact on growth management (Burby and Dalton 1994) and economic 
development policy (Blakely and Bradshaw 2002) of communities.  
In addition to being an important tool in community development, zoning is also 
associated with significant private interests. Lubell et al. (2005) argue that economic 
and development interests have a substantial interest in land-use decisions, because 
land-use policy has consequences for the private risk and return of investments. In fact, 
land use is recognized as the quintessential targeted policy that can direct benefits to 
particular constituencies (Denzau and Weingast 1982). The argument by Fleischmann 
(1989) shows that the direction of benefits in zoning decisions is particularly vulnerable 
to face conflicting interests, since zoning involves complex relationships among elected 
officials, local government professionals, appointed zoning commissions, and various 
private interests.  
Cordes (1989) presents five specific problems of bias and conflicts of interest in zoning 
decision making. He argues that the clearest and most frequent type of impermissible 
conflicting interest is the financial conflict. By financial conflicts he refers to situations 
in which a participating decision-maker might benefit financially, for example as a 
business associate or landowner. Although the decision-maker might not realize an 
immediate financial benefit, there might be substantial pressure to make a particular 
decision to ensure that the relationship, including its attendant financial rewards, 
continues. A second source of conflicts of interest in zoning decision making stems 
from other types of relationships that a decision-maker might have with parties involved 
in or affected by zoning decisions. These relationships with an interested party might 
improperly affect the ultimate decision, thus calling into question the accuracy of 
decisions and undermining the legitimacy of the system. As a third source Cordes 
presents biases based on self-interest. Ex parte communications between zoning 
decision-makers and private parties presents the fourth problem in zoning decisions. 
These communications, in which one or more of the concerned parties is not present, 
imply a challenge since they do not allow all parties a chance to respond to presented 
views. This may significantly reinforce public perception that zoning boards are subject 
to special influence. A final source of biases in zoning is the receipt of campaign 
contributions by a decision-maker who must later decide an issue affecting the 
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contributor. The contributions raise serious fairness concerns, mainly because of the 
perception that favorable decisions can be bought. This framework presented by Cordes 
illustrates that local zoning decision-makers are vulnerable to several types of conflicts 
of interest and biases. 
Several papers have pursued to explain local ofﬁcials’ land use policymaking. Previous 
literature supports the importance of professional planners’ advice, the desire to avoid 
conflicts and harm to citizens, as well as specific local circumstances as three key 
factors inﬂuencing local ofﬁcials’ land use decision making (Koontz 2005). Moreover, 
political pressure and the commitments of local ofﬁcials have been found to affect 
recommendations for land use policy changes (Burby and May 1997). Fleischmann and 
Pierannunzi (1990) examine factors affecting re-zoning decision of local governments 
in Atlanta. Their results show that the zoning commissions’ recommendations dominate 
the governing bodies’ decision making in re-zoning cases. Burby and May also 
conclude that the commitment of zoning staff is a key variable inﬂuencing the adoption 
of plan policy recommendations. Several papers also argue that members of municipal 
councils decide re-zoning by satisfying as many constituents as possible to be re-elected 
(Siegan 1972, 16-18; Weaver and Babcock 1979, 5-10, 140-153; Fischel 1985, 207-
230). According to Schneider (1989), one of the advantages that business constituents 
have in land-use decisions is their perceived importance to local economies. However, 
Fleischmann and Pierannunzi find that business and citizens’ interests do not have a 
clear effect on the local officials’ land use decision making. Furthermore, Fleischmann 
and Pierannunzi have recognized the significance of local circumstances for zoning 
decision making. Local context is likely to bring unique factors that affect land use 
decision making. This is an important observation, which implies that the 
generalizability of the results of zoning related research is often limited. For example, in 
declining areas, there is likely to be more support for increased development rather than 
farmland preservation.  
One challenge to the fairness of zoning decisions and the direction of benefits to 
different parties is presented by the composition of zoning decision making bodies. 
Ostrow (2008) argues that because of their small size and homogenous constituency, 
local decision making bodies are particularly vulnerable to political capture by a single 
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interest group. He argues that the factional domination can appear in several ways at the 
local level. One is sheer corruption, made possible in smaller representative bodies 
because a limited number of persons have influence that could potentially be bought. 
Another possibility is domination by a few actors who are perceived by others as 
powerful. Ross and Smith (1994) also support the claim that zoning decisions are 
especially vulnerable to problems of bias and conflicts of interest because of the 
localized nature of the decisions, the fact that members of zoning boards are drawn from 
the immediate geographical area and the political nature of the zoning process. 
Extant literature has also focused on analyzing the actual composition of zoning-
decisions making bodies. Walker (1950, 150-153) reports that zoning boards in 31 large 
US cities were dominated by business owners, professionals, and technical occupations 
in 1937. This phenomenon seems to still exist as in a more recent study Anderson and 
Sass (2004) find that in the US, small towns have a fairly representative board makeup, 
but blue-collar citizens are significantly underrepresented in larger cities. They also 
conclude that the majority of those sitting on zoning boards tend to benefit, either 
directly or indirectly, from development. Anderson et al. (2008) present similar 
evidence for the proposition that individuals with white-collar occupations dominate 
zoning boards in the US. Moreover, they find that individuals with professional 
occupations in business are disproportionately represented in zoning boards. In addition, 
over 30% of board members are found to have a direct interest in property development. 
Walker argues that this occupational distribution may cause several consequences. He 
argues that large representation of specific occupations may hinder the committees’ 
ability to reflect “the citizen point of view” and the decisions undertaken do not 
represent the population as whole. To determine the potential effects of the occupational 
skew, Anderson et al. conduct a survey of citizens to determine whether their attitudes 
toward controversial land use issues vary according to demographic factors, including 
occupation. They find that various demographic characteristics correlate with differing 
attitudes towards zoning issues. Thus, their results suggest that a board composed of a 
broader cross section of citizens might make different decisions than a board with more 
skewed representation. 
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Overall, academics have widely recognized the importance of zoning decisions for 
different interest groups, as well as the particular vulnerability of these decisions to 
conflicts of interest. However, most of the papers are written from a legal perspective 
and do not focus on empirical analysis. Consequently, the political nature of zoning 
decisions has been analyzed empirically only to a limited extent. 
3.3 Research on ABC service station stores 
In this section, I first discuss an earlier report on the political connections of S Group 
commissioned by fuel retailer interest groups. Despite that the report is not an academic 
study, I consider it as an essential part of this section as it seems to be the only 
published piece of work that directly relates to my research questions and the only 
existing attempt to analyze the political connections of S Group. Second, I briefly 
present relevant research on the operating environment of Finnish service stations. 
3.3.1 Political connections of S Group 
Laitinen (2007) analyzes S Group’s political connections and their effects on the land 
allocation decisions in a report written for the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, the 
Association of Finnish Fuel Retailers
63
 and the Foundation for Retail Trade Research
64
. 
Laitinen identifies the political connections of S Group by analyzing the dual roles that 
the members of the supervisory boards and the boards of directors of S Group’s regional 
cooperatives have in municipal councils, municipal boards and committees. Laitinen’s 
research was carried out between October 2006 and January 2007, but the exact moment 
for measuring political connections is not defined.  
Laitinen concludes that the political connections of S Group cause significant 
ineligibility problems due to the widespread existence of political connections. To 
analyze the effect of these connections on the land allocation decisions, Laitinen 
presents descriptive example cases of the land allocation and opening decisions of ABC 
service station stores from several municipalities. These case descriptions remain to 
some extent anecdotal, as Laitinen does not report the exact sources for the used 
information. Laitinen’s main conclusion is that municipalities have favored S Group in 
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land allocation decisions due to the group’s political connections. However, the results 
that he reports do not make the causality between the political connections and 
favorable zoning decisions apparent.  
3.3.2 Operating environment of service station stores 
A novel academic study by Mäntylä et al. (2011) analyzes the impacts that service 
station stores have on their operating environment in Finland. The sample of analyzed 
units consists of four service station stores of which three belong to the ABC chain. 
Their interview and survey based research focuses on the overall operating 
environment, and does not specifically concentrate on the land allocation decisions of 
municipalities. Nevertheless, they find no evidence for that the regional cooperatives of 
S Group would be in a better position than competitors in the land allocation decisions 
of municipalities. Based on their interviews with municipal representatives, in small 
rural areas all companies that are willing to invest in the area are provided with support 
and allocated land when feasible. However, due to the interview and survey based 
research methodology and the sensitive nature of the topic, it is possible that the results 
are biased due to subjective answers. 
Moreover, Mäntylä et al. (2011) analyze factors that affect the placement of service 
station stores. According to them, the placement of automated filling stations is less 
dependent on their neighboring area than grocery stores. Mäntylä et al. state that the 
road network is the most important factor in the placement of automated filling stations, 
whereas service stations that sell grocery goods are more strongly affected by the 
structure and offering of other nearby grocery stores. Similarly, the service stations with 
extensive grocery store operations are likely to affect the competition both in the fuel 
trade and grocery store markets. Also Lähde (1999) reports that the likelihood that a 
grocery store is located in conjunction with a service station increases with the size of 
municipality and the significance of the road along which the service station is located. 
According to a report written by the Finnish Road Administration (2007) service station 
stores are typically located neither in city centers nor remote areas, since they aim to 
serve both road passengers and local inhabitants. Thus traffic amounts, the amount of 
local population and competition affect strongly the location of service station stores. 
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Mäntylä et al. (2011) also analyze the impacts that service station stores have on their 
operating environment. They state that the municipalities covered by their research have 
started to develop the area where an ABC service station store is located, but the 
direction of the causality is not clear. They also conclude that customers have started to 
either partially use the services of new service station stores at the expense of existing 
grocery retailers. However, the interviews with local entrepreneurs and inhabitants 
suggest that this impact of the new service station stores has had no major effects on the 
level of competition. In the interviews, other grocery store entrepreneurs felt that they 
have not lost customers due to the service station stores. This evidence on the small 
effect on the local competition may be caused by the fact that road passengers are an 
important customer group of service station stores. Mäntylä et al. conclude that the 
phenomenon is mainly related to the increase in new road passenger customers that stop 
within the municipality after the opening of a new service station store, not to changes 
in the local residents’ purchasing behavior. 
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4 Research questions 
This section presents the research questions of my study. First, I present the research 
questions that focus on analyzing the relationship between S Group’s political 
connections and the zoning decisions of the group’s ABC service station stores. After 
that I discuss my research question on the association between the group’s political 
connections and the market share of its service station stores. Since my thesis focuses 
on a highly specific phenomenon and the amount of extant studies examining the effect 
of political connections on zoning decisions is very limited, my research questions are 
mostly drawn from anecdotes presented in the press, as well as logical expectations 
derived from these anecdotes, rather than empirically validated previous research.  
4.1 Research questions on zoning decision making 
The anecdotes presented in the press mainly state that the political connections of 
S Group have granted the group preferential access to land and favorable treatment in 
zoning decisions (see e.g. Leivonniemi 2010; Ranta 2011; Ranta 2012). Specifically, 
these anecdotes state that the zoning decisions of the group’s ABC service station stores 
have been affected by the group’s political connections. In the case of ABC service 
station stores, the motivation to utilize political connections in zoning decisions may 
arise from both involved sides. First, politically connected representatives might have 
incentives and power to lobby ABC service station stores to be located in their 
municipalities. Second, S Group may have an incentive to leverage these connections in 
the zoning decision making. 
According to Jiang (2008), politicians are self-motivated to build a career through 
improving the employment rate, regional fiscal and economic health. Thus, the 
incentive for politically connected S Group representatives may arise for instance from 
the positive effect of ABC service station stores on the employment and service offering 
of a municipality. Due to their relatively large size and service offering, ABC service 
station stores often have a significant role as an employer and a service provider, 
especially in smaller municipalities (Mäntylä et al. 2011). It is noteworthy that the 
median population of the 336 Finnish municipalities is relatively low, only 5,839 in 
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2012
65
, implying that there is a large amount of small municipalities for which an ABC 
service station store in itself is a relatively significant employer.  
Although the potentially improved employment rate and wider service offering often 
benefit local citizens, fair market competition may suffer if politicians prefer to achieve 
these objectives by favoring a certain operator, such as the S Group. Smaller operators 
are unlikely to have as wide political connections as S Group, which through its 21 
regional cooperatives has a strong local presence in nearly all Finnish municipalities. If 
the political connections are used to obtain favorable zoning decisions for the group’s 
units, the connections can simultaneously be used to hinder smaller competitors to even 
compete with the group’s units. As Jiang (2008) states, while accomplishing specific 
objectives may improve politicians’ own welfare, it may come at the expense of the 
equality of different parties. It can be further argued that as a consequence of the 
unequal treatment of different business actors, the efficiency of markets may ultimately 
suffer. 
 In addition to the proposition that political connections can be used to lobby the 
placement decisions of ABC service station stores, municipal politicians themselves 
also have a financial incentive to become S Group representatives. The regional 
cooperatives of S Group have the right to grant discounts for the members of their board 
of directors and supervisory board. Until 2010, the regional cooperatives had the right to 
give these discounts also to the members of the council of representatives, but in 2010 
SOK recommended that regional cooperatives remove these discounts. (Koskinen 
2010.) However, the discount practices had varied between regional cooperatives and 
not all of them had provided discounts to the members of councils of representatives 
even before the year 2010 (Pohjalainen 2010). 
Thus in practice, the S Group representatives benefit financially from the presence of 
the group’s units in their municipalities, which may create an incentive for connected 
representatives to use their political power to locate ABC service station stores into their 
municipality. In addition to the discounts, the representatives also receive compensation 
from their participation in the group’s decision making organs. The level of 
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compensation varies according to the position.
66
 Even though this compensation 
probably does not directly contribute to the phenomenon, some representatives may be 
motivated to lobby zoning decisions relevant to S Group in order to keep their seats in 
the representative bodies of the cooperative. 
The politicians’ self-interest represents only one side of the coin. S group managers 
might be motivated to locate service station stores into municipalities that are more 
strongly connected to the group to facilitate the investment process. Strong connections 
might make certain municipalities to seem more lucrative and create value for the group 
for instance, by accelerating the process or allowing access to better land areas.  
The incentives for utilizing political connections in the zoning decision making may 
thus stem from multiple sources. However, the mere existence of political connections 
does not necessarily imply that these connections are actually leveraged in the zoning 
decision making. Thus my first research question asks whether the political connections 
of S Group representatives are associated with the zoning decisions of its ABC service 
station stores. If political connections are related to the zoning decisions of the group’s 
service station stores, one could expect that an ABC service station store is more likely 
to be zoned and opened in a municipality where S Group’s political connections are 
stronger. 
Research question 1A: Is an ABC service station store more likely to be opened 
in a municipality where S Group’s political connections are stronger? 
The second part of my first research question (i.e. 1B) stems from the decentralized 
governance structure of S Group. As discussed in Section 2, S Group’s regional 
cooperatives operate mainly in specified operating areas. Each of the operating areas 
covers several municipalities
67
. Thus if one municipality is more strongly connected 
than another municipality belonging to the same regional cooperative’s operating area, 
the politically connected representatives of the more strongly connected municipality 
might have more power in the placement decision of a new ABC service station store. 
Again, the group might also prefer to locate the ABC service station store into the more 
strongly connected municipality to utilize these connections. Thus a municipality’s 
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share of the total connections of a regional cooperative is also a potential candidate to 
explain the zoning decisions of ABC service station stores. Therefore, the second part of 
my first research question asks whether the likelihood that an ABC service station store 
is zoned and opened in a municipality is greater in a municipality that has a larger share 
of the total connections of the relevant regional cooperative. The research question 
differs from the research question 1A in that this second part focuses on measuring 
political connections of a municipality in relation to connections of other municipalities 
belonging to the same regional cooperative, instead of analyzing each municipality 
independently. 
Research question 1B: The strength of political connections differs from one 
municipality to another within a regional cooperative’s coverage area. Within 
that area, is an ABC service station store more likely to be opened in a 
municipality with stronger political connections? 
Anecdotes in the press also state that S Group’s service station stores have been 
provided with better land areas (see e.g. Leivonniemi 2010). If the political connections 
of the group create value in the zoning processes and land allocation decisions of ABC 
service station stores, then one could expect that the service station stores are more 
likely to be located in better operating areas than their competitors in more strongly 
connected municipalities. As discussed earlier, location is a vital competitive aspect for 
service station stores. Thus, the allocation of better locations to ABC service station 
stores might represent one source through which political connections create value for 
the group. Consequently, my second research question is formulated as follows: 
Research question 2: Are ABC service station stores located in better operating 
areas than their competitors in more strongly connected municipalities? 
4.2 Research question on market share 
In addition to stemming naturally from better competitive advantage, market share may 
also be based on a monopolistic position or stem from advantages in obtaining 
concessions or licenses (Faccio 2007). In the service station business, one such type of 
concession could be privileged access to land. It is possible that politically connected 
firms can influence the outcome of land allocation decisions, and are consequently 
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allocated with better land areas. It can be hypothesized that this phenomenon creates 
barriers to entry for competitors and weakens price competition, which in turn leads to 
higher market share for the politically connected firms. Therefore, if political 
connections are associated with the zoning decisions of S Group, the market share of 
ABC service station stores can be expected to be higher in more strongly connected 
municipalities. Since ABC service station stores also include a grocery store, one can 
expect that they affect the competition of both the service station and small grocery 
store markets. My third research question is therefore formulated as follows: 
Research question 3: Do ABC service station stores have higher market shares in 
small grocery store and service station markets in municipalities where S Group’s 
political connections are stronger? 
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5 Methods and data 
In this section I first describe the research design used in this study. Second, I provide 
an overview of the statistical methods applied in the thesis and present the procedure 
used for determining the political connections of S Group. Third, I define the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Fourth, I give a brief overview of the sample selection 
process to introduce the reader to my data. Finally, I describe the sample, the data 
retrieval process and the data sources in more detail. 
5.1 Research design   
I employ a modified case-study approach from an independent researcher’s standpoint 
to analyze whether politically connected firms can gain from their connections to 
municipal politics. I focus on the expansion of S Group’s ABC service station store 
network to analyze the relationship between political connections, zoning decisions and 
market power. I see my approach as a useful starting point for analyzing the value of 
political connections in Finland, since it allows me to focus precisely on the governance 
structure of a specific firm. The case-study approach also allows me to focus on a 
question that has already garnered significant public attention and has economic 
importance on its own, i.e. whether S Group can gain from having political connections 
in the form of preferential access to land. My research design can be divided into the 
following four steps: 
(1) I analyze the existing evidence on the effect of political connections on the 
zoning decisions of S Group and find that the discussion on the topic is almost 
purely driven by anecdotes. Most of the anecdotes presented in the press also 
seem to be based only on the proposition that S Group seems to be connected to 
municipal politics via dual roles of their representatives in municipal 
administrative bodies. After carefully scanning the research and public discussion 
on the political connections of the group and the penetration of its service station 
stores, I formulate my three research questions. The research questions are mainly 
inspired by the public discussion due to the limited amount of previous empirical 
evidence and academic studies on similar topics.    
39 
 
 
(2) I build a unique panel dataset to measure the relationship between political 
connections, zoning decisions and market power. My comprehensive dataset is 
composed of three subsets. The first subset consists of the names of the 
representatives of S Group’s regional cooperatives collected from the entire 
observation period. The second set contains the names of the municipal councilors 
of the municipalities that belong to the operating areas of S Group’s regional 
cooperatives. The second set also contains the members of the municipal boards 
and selected committees of the municipalities. My third subset consists of detailed 
information on all retail trade units in Finland, including road traffic amounts near 
unit locations.  
(3) After collecting the data I cross-reference the names of S Group and 
municipality representatives to detect possible connections. I define several 
variables to measure the level of political connections of the group and use these 
measures as my key explanatory variables. I also detect the lag between zoning 
decision and opening dates of ABC service station stores to be able to measure the 
political connections at the appropriate moments in time.  
(4) In the empirical part I employ both univariate and multivariate analyses to 
study whether the political connections of S Group have been associated with the 
zoning decisions of its ABC service station stores and their market share. The 
univariate analyses are mainly based on proportional tests whereas Probit and 
OLS regressions are employed in the multivariate analyses. 
5.2 Statistical methods  
In this subsection I discuss the usage of panel data, the matching procedures used to 
determine the political connections and the type of regression analyses employed in this 
thesis.  
5.2.1 Usage of panel data 
Panel data is generally defined as a dataset that contains observations on multiple 
phenomena over a period of time for the observed individuals or observation targets. 
Panel data thus includes a cross-sectional dimension and a time series dimension. In this 
study, the used panel dataset includes multiple observations for the same municipality 
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over time. The use of panel data provides several advantages such as the ability to 
control for variables that cannot be measured. However, the use of panel data is also 
often associated with a number of limitations. In my analysis the most significant 
problem is autocorrelation, which is a frequent problem of panel data. In this study this 
implies that standard errors are correlated over time for a given municipality, which 
results in biased standard errors. Autocorrelation does not affect the coefficients but the 
statistical significance of the coefficients is affected through the effect on standard 
errors. However, autocorrelation can be controlled by using cluster-robust standard 
errors. I cluster the standard errors at the municipality level to reduce the potential to 
overstate significance of the variables.  
5.2.2 Matching political connections 
In much of my analysis, I analyze the propensity of municipalities that are politically 
connected with S Group’s regional cooperatives to build ABC service station stores to 
unconnected or less strongly connected municipalities. My analysis focuses on the 
municipal level due to the local nature of S Group’s governance structure and the fact 
that the zoning decisions relevant to service station projects are made by municipal 
councils, municipal boards and specific committees. Therefore, S Group’s potential 
connections for instance with Members of Parliament would not, in this context, be as 
interesting to analyze as potential connections with municipal representatives. 
Connections to municipal politics are also more interesting to analyze than the 
connections to e.g. Members of Parliament because most municipal politicians retain 
other occupations alongside their political career.  
In this thesis, I focus only on direct connections, i.e. dual roles of politicians and S 
Group’s representatives. Indirect connections, such as connections through family 
members and relatives, are excluded for two reasons. First, they are hard to detect in a 
reliable way. Second, their explanatory power is likely to be smaller than that of direct 
dual role connections. Although several papers use campaign contributions as a proxy 
for political connections (see e.g. Jayachandran 2006), these contributions are not used 
in this thesis due to the limited availability of data before the year 2009. Additionally, 
Faccio (2006) decides against using campaign contributions to measure political 
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connections, as he argues that connections via dual roles are likely to be more durable 
than one-time campaign contributions or cash payments. 
Thus, to detect the political connections of S Group, the names of the members of the 
group’s governance organs are cross-referenced with the names of municipal 
politicians. Before cross-referencing the names, I divide the names into separate groups 
according to the operating areas of regional cooperatives to improve the reliability of 
my results, and to diminish the change that people who share the same name are 
matched incorrectly. 
5.2.3 Regression analysis  
To assess whether political connections are significant in explaining the likelihood of 
favorable zoning decision for ABC service station stores, I mainly use multivariate 
Probit regressions. Since Probit regression estimates the probability of a certain event, 
the method can be employed when the dependent variable is binary. For instance, in this 
thesis the Probit regressions estimate the probability that an ABC service station store is 
opened in a municipality. Unlike OLS regression, Probit regression does not assume 
that the relationship between a dependent variable and explanatory variables is linear. 
To analyze the relationship between political connections and the market power I use 
OLS analysis. Due to autocorrelation in the data, robust standard errors clustered at the 
municipality level are used in each of the regression specifications. In conjunction with 
Probit analyses I also report marginal effects calculated at the means of the variables. 
Marginal effects often provide a good approximation to the amount of change in the 
dependent variable that will be produced by a one-unit change in the independent 
variable. Since the group of control variables is limited for certain hypotheses, I analyze 
the hypotheses also by cross-tabulating the observations. Proportional tests are used to 
analyze the statistical significance of the difference in proportions between groups. 
5.3 Variables and regression models  
In this section I present all variables used in this study. First, I specify my dependent 
variables. I then describe the variables used to measure the political connections of the 
regional cooperatives. To better capture the relationship between political connections 
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and zoning decisions, I employ several definitions for political connections. Finally, I 
present the control variables applied in this study. 
5.3.1 Dependent variables 
To examine whether the political connections of S Group are associated with the 
likelihood that an ABC service station store is zoned and opened in a municipality, I 
define a dummy variable which gets the value of 1 if an ABC service station store is 
opened in the municipality and 0 otherwise. The likelihood is estimated by using Probit 
regression on yearly observations. This means that each municipality forms one 
observation for each year during the examination period.  
ABC zoned is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an ABC service station store is 
zoned and opened in a municipality during the observation year, and 0 otherwise. 
(Research questions 1A and 1B) 
To analyze whether ABC service station stores are located in better operating areas than 
their competitors, I construct a Probit regression in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy that measures whether the traffic amounts are higher near an ABC service 
station store than near the locations of its competitors. I compare the traffic amount to 
the average traffic amount of all the competitors in a municipality, as well as to the 
competitor with the highest traffic amount. The traffic amount is the highest average 
daily traffic amount measured within a specific radius. The radiuses used in this thesis 
need to be relatively short, as easy access from a main road is an important competitive 
factor in the service station store business. Therefore, I decide to use radiuses of 500 
meters and one kilometer. Even though the one-kilometer radius might seem too long in 
the context of service station stores, I still employ it in my analyses since due to road 
arrangements the shorter radius may not be able to capture all traffic amounts from the 
roads that the service station unit serves. In research question 2, only the service stations 
that operate in the same municipality with the ABC service station store are included as 
competitors. I limit the competitor group for this research question to service stations, 
since traffic amounts are likely to have a different effect on the location preferences of 
service stations and small grocery stores, although the grocery stores partly operate in 
the same market with ABC service station stores. 
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Better land is a dummy variable that gets the value of 1 if the traffic amount close 
to an ABC service station store is higher than the average traffic amounts close to 
its nearby competitors’ and 0 otherwise. In unreported regressions, the traffic 
amount near an ABC service station is also compared to the competitors with the 
highest traffic amount in the municipality. The traffic amount is measured as the 
highest average daily traffic amount within half and one kilometer radiuses of the 
unit. (Research question 2) 
To examine whether ABC service station stores have higher market shares in more 
strongly connected municipalities, I define an OLS regression in which the dependent 
variable measures the market share of all the ABC service station stores within the 
municipality. Since the net sales of ABC service station stores are not reported, I use the 
personnel classification of the Business Register of Statistics Finland to develop a proxy 
for market share. The classification consists of nine categories, which each cover a 
specific range of employees. I use the midpoint from each range to calculate a proxy for 
the market share of ABC service station stores. In the third research question, I widen 
the competitor group to service stations and small grocery stores, since ABC service 
station stores also include a grocery store. The standard industrial classification is used 
to identify service stations and small grocery stores. In this thesis the small grocery 
store market includes units that operate under TOL 2008 codes 47112, 47113 and 
47114. These codes correspond to small supermarkets (over 400 m² but not more than 
1,000 m²), self-service stores (over 100 m² but not more than 400 m²) and smaller units 
such as kiosks (under 100 m
2
). The service station market is covered by the TOL 2008 
code 47301. 
Market share is the share of ABC service station store(s)’ employees of the total 
amount of employees of small grocery stores and service stations within one 
municipality. (Research question 3) 
5.3.2 Measurements for political connections 
Due to the decentralized decision making structure of both S Group and Finnish 
municipalities, defining political connections is a fairly complicated proposition. In this 
thesis, I use the expression connected members to refer to persons who have a dual role 
in the analyzed municipal decision making organs (municipal council, municipal board, 
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and specific committees) and in the decision making bodies of regional cooperatives 
(council of representatives, board of directors, and supervisory board). By relevant 
committees I refer to municipal committees that are relevant to construction and zoning 
decisions. In this thesis the expression irrelevant committees is used to refer to 
education and social committees, which are used as control committees.  
The connections in different municipal decision making bodies are analyzed separately 
in the empirical part to better understand the role of these different types of connections 
in zoning decision making. Municipal councils are chosen to the analysis, since as 
discussed in Section 2, Finnish Local Government Act requires that all but minor local 
detailed plans are approved by the municipal council. Municipal boards and committees 
are included in the analysis since they are entitled to approve minor plans not approved 
by the municipal council, and since they also may participate in the preparation of plans. 
Irrelevant committees are chosen into the analysis for two reasons. First, I use them to 
test whether S Group’s connections are more likely to occur in relevant or irrelevant 
committees. Second, I use them to analyze whether connections in these organs are 
related to the zoning decisions in a different way than in the organs relevant for zoning 
decisions. 
In addition to analyzing whether the existence of political connections is associated with 
the zoning decisions of S Group, I also analyze whether the strength of these political 
connections is related to the zoning decisions. I partly follow previous academic 
research on political connections (see e.g. Faccio 2006; Claessens et al. 2008) and 
define the following measurements for the political connections of S Group: 
 (1) Connected is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one S 
Group representative (council of representatives, board of directors or supervisory 
board member) is also a member of a municipal council, a municipal board, a 
committee relevant to building and zoning decisions or of two control committees 
and 0 otherwise. 
 (2) % of connected is the amount of connected S Group’s representatives 
compared to all the members in the abovementioned municipal decision making 
bodies. 
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(3) Votes is the share of votes received by elected S Group’s representatives in 
municipal elections.  
For the purposes of the second part of my first research question (i.e. 1B), I construct a 
variable that measures the variation in the level of political connections within 
municipalities belonging to the operating area of a single regional cooperative. To 
capture the variation, I use the measurements for political connections presented above, 
but so that the level of political connections of one municipality is compared to the total 
number of connected S Group representatives within the operating area of the regional 
cooperative in question. Thus, two proxies for political connection for the purposes of 
the research question 1B are constructed as follows: 
(1) A municipality's share of all connected municipal councilors within the 
operating area of a regional cooperative 
(2) The share of votes received by the connected municipal councilors of a 
municipality compared to the total share of votes received by connected 
councilors within the operating area of the relevant regional cooperative 
According to Finnish Law, municipalities can merge their councils either fully or 
partially if a municipal merger occurs during the office period of the municipal 
councils
68
. In this thesis, I assume that the councils are merged fully in each of the cases 
where a merger occurs during the office period. During my observation period there 
were only 19 municipal mergers that came into force during the office term of 
municipal councils
69
, therefore the assumption I made is unlikely to affect the reliability 
of my results. The composition of municipal decision making organs may also change 
during the office term and calendar year. To simplify my analysis, I decide to use the 
year-end composition of decision making organs. 
5.3.3 Control variables 
Control variables are used to control for other factors that may be related to the zoning 
decisions and market share of ABC service station stores. Traffic amounts, local 
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 Municipal Merger Act (1698/2009), Chapter 6 Section 24. 
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 The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, 2012: www.localfinland.fi, referred 
23.3.2012. 
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population and the competitive situation have been found to strongly affect the location 
of service stations (Finnish Road Administration 2007). I relegate competition at the 
municipal level to a robustness check because ABC service station stores are likely to 
be located in larger cities where competition is often stronger. Therefore, one can expect 
that the difference in the competition between different neighborhoods of a municipality 
is a more important factor for the location decisions of ABC service station stores than 
the municipality level competition. As a robustness check, I also employ population 
density as an alternative variable for measuring the characteristics of the local 
population. The size of municipality is used as a control variable in the analysis on the 
market shares of ABC service station stores, since competition can be expected to be 
higher in larger cities. Based on these observations, my control variables are defined as 
follows: 
Main control variables 
Size of municipality is the natural logarithm of the population of a municipality. 
Distance from ABC is the natural logarithm of the distance to the nearest 
municipality with an ABC service station store measured in meters. 
Highway is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a municipality is located 
along a highway and 0 otherwise.  
I use the Finnish Road Statistics
70
 to determine which roads cross through which 
municipalities. The municipalities for which highway kilometers are equal to more than 
one are considered to be located along a highway. Highways
71
 are roads that serve long 
distance traffic between regions. In Finland, they are labeled with numbers 1 through 
39.  
Control variables used as robustness checks 
Competition is measured by using the Herfindahl index. In this thesis, I follow the 
standard definition of the Herfindahl index and define it as the sum of the squares 
of the market shares of the 50 largest firms (or summed over all the firms if there 
are fewer than 50) within the service station and small grocery store market.  
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 The Finnish Transport Agency, 2010. 
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 In Finnish: valtatie. 
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Both service stations and small grocery stores are used in the index, since ABC service 
station stores always include a grocery store. Increases in the Herfindahl index generally 
indicate a decrease in competition and an increase in market power, whereas decreases 
indicate the opposite. I use the size of personnel classification of the Business Register 
of Statistics Finland as a proxy for market shares as defined earlier in the dependent 
variable section. 
Population density is the natural logarithm of the population density of a 
municipality. 
In each of the regression specifications the control variables are always measured with 
the same lag as the political connection variables. 
5.4 Sample selection 
First, I look at the sample selection from the regional cooperatives’ side. My sample 
includes all S Group’s regional cooperatives that have operated in Finland between 
1996 and 2009. During the examination period the number of regional cooperatives 
decreased from 23 to 22 due to a merger between two regional cooperatives
72
. The 
merger between regional cooperatives is treated so that the entities are considered as 
separate units until the merger and as one entity after that. I exclude the local 
cooperatives from the sample due to their different position in the group and minor size. 
The governance organs of S Group that are analyzed in this study are the councils of 
representatives, the boards of directors and the supervisory boards of regional 
cooperatives.  
Next, I look at the sample selection process from the standpoint of service station stores. 
My initial sample includes all ABC service station stores that were opened between 
1998 and 2010 and that were still operational in 2010. The start of the period is selected 
based on the building year of the first unit of the ABC service station store chain. Of the 
108 ABC service station stores that existed at the end of 2010, four were originally 
investments of local cooperatives. These four units are tracked from the press releases 
and annual reports of S Group. Due to the exclusion of local cooperatives, I also 
exclude the service station stores that were initially opened by them from my sample. I 
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also exclude one service station store from the sample for which I am unable to 
determine the opening year in a reliable way. Moreover, I add to my sample three units 
that were built during the examination period but were closed at the latest in 2010. I am 
able to track these units from the press releases of S Group.  
As discussed in Section 2, it is also important to note that all ABC service station stores 
have not been pure new investments i.e. green-field projects. Since my study focuses on 
the zoning decisions of the service station stores, the main sample only includes the 
units that have been pure new investments. Acquired units and old stations that have 
been converted under the ABC brand have been excluded from all empirical tests except 
for the market share analysis. The ABC gasoline stations that only sell gasoline, i.e. 
unmanned or cold stations that do not provide any extra services such as grocery stores 
or restaurants are not included in the sample. Due to the relatively small size and land 
area requirements of the unmanned stations, their zoning decisions are likely to differ 
from those of actual service station stores. The sample therefore only includes the units 
that S Group defines as ABC service station stores. The final sample of pure new 
investment ABC service station stores opened by the regional cooperatives consists of 
64 units.  
I next turn to the selection of the municipality sample, which is guided by my decision 
to exclude local cooperatives from the sample. My study covers all municipalities where 
the regional cooperatives of S Group operated during 1996 and 2009. I exclude the 
operating areas of local cooperatives and the Åland islands from my sample. The 
municipalities located in the Åland islands are excluded from the sample due to their 
unique location, which likely affects the possibility that an ABC service station store is 
located in the area. In fact, in 2010, no ABC service station stores were located in the 
Åland islands. The number of municipalities covered by my analyses varies year by 
year due to municipal mergers. Municipalities that have merged during the observation 
period are treated as separate municipalities until the merger is completed and as one 
entity after that. The sample size also varies year by year due to mergers between 
regional and local cooperatives. From the press releases of S Group, I determine that 11 
local cooperatives merged with regional cooperatives during the examination period. 
The operating areas of merged local cooperatives are included in the sample starting 
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from their first full operating year as part of the regional cooperative. As a final 
adjustment I exclude one municipality located near to the borders of regional 
cooperatives, which I am not able to allocate in a reliable way to any of the surrounding 
regional cooperatives. After all these adjustments, the final sample of the year 1996 
consists of 416 municipalities. By 2009, the number of municipalities in my sample has 
diminished to 325. In total, the final sample consists of 5,587 municipality years. 
This study focuses on S Group’s representatives’ connections to municipal politics, 
since the zoning decisions of small retail trade units are made on the municipal level. 
All municipal councilors of the municipalities belonging to the operating areas of 
regional cooperatives are therefore included in my sample. In addition to municipal 
councils, important organs in the municipal administration from the zoning process 
point of view are the municipal board and certain committees. Therefore, these organs 
are also analyzed in this study. In summary, my study covers the connections between S 
Group’s regional cooperatives’ representatives and municipal councils, municipal 
boards and committees relevant to building and zoning decisions. Moreover, as a 
control test I analyze the connections to two irrelevant committees that should have a 
smaller or no role in zoning processes. 
5.5 Data retrieval and sources  
To analyze the relationship between S Group’s political connections and the zoning 
decisions and market share of its ABC service station stores, I construct a dataset that 
includes data on political connections of the regional cooperatives, ABC service station 
stores and their competitors, zoning decisions, traffic amounts and municipality specific 
descriptive statistics covering the time period from 1996 to 2009. Table 3 summarizes 
my main datasets and their sources. 
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Table 3 Data sources 
 
5.5.1 Political connections 
This subsection describes the data I use to measure the level of political connections of 
S Group. First, I present the process of retrieving the data on S Group’s representatives. 
Second, I describe the retrieval of municipality level data and describe how the data on 
municipal politicians was collected from Finnish municipalities. Third, I describe the 
results of matching of these two datasets. 
Data Items Source
Political connections
Names of the representatives of S Group's 
regional cooperatives (council of 
representatives, board of directors and 
supervisory board)
18,612 names
Typed manually from the annual reports of the 
regional cooperatives. The annual reports are 
obtained from the National Library and the 
National Board of Patents and Registration of 
Finland
Names of the municipal councilors elected in 
the municipal elections of the years 1996, 
2000, 2004 and 2008 
47,138 names
Downloaded from the election database of 
Statistics Finland
Names of the members of municipal boards, 
committees relevant to building and zoning 
decisions and two committees on education 
and social affairs used as a control group
118,142 names
Typed manually from the material provided by 
183 Finnish municipalities
ABC service station stores and 
competitors
Detailed establishment level information on 
retail trade units in Finland
Location, amount of 
personnel and 
establishment date for 
354,103 retail trade unit 
years
Business Register of Statistics Finland, annual 
reports of the regional cooperatives, press 
releases
Traffic amounts
Daily traffic amounts for 
main roads near the retail 
trade units
The Finnish Transport Agency (Digiroad 2010)
Zoning decisions
Lags between the plan approval and 
opening dates of ABC service station stores
Date of approval of the 
current local detailed 
plan for the operating 
plots of ABC service 
station stores
The National Land Survey of Finland
Control variables
Descriptive statistics on the municipal level
Population, population 
density, road network
The National Land Survey of Finland, the 
Finnish Transport Agency, Statistics Finland, 
the Association of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities
This table presents the data used to analyze the relationship between S Group's political connections and the zoning decisions 
and market share of ABC service station stores.
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5.5.1.1 Retrieval of S Group data  
To measure the political connections I first collect data on S Group representatives. As 
discussed in Section 2, the administration bodies of the regional cooperatives include a 
council of representatives, a board of directors and a supervisory board. Out of these, 
the council of representatives is not a mandatory organ. However, in 2009 S Group 
consisted of 22 regional cooperatives of which only two did not have a council of 
representatives. One regional cooperative chose its first council of representatives in 
2007
73
. The other 19 regional cooperatives had a council of representatives during the 
whole examination period
74
. The existence of a council of representatives is likely to 
have a major effect on the amplitude of the political connections of a regional 
cooperative, since the councils typically consist of dozens of members. 
To measure the political connections of S Group representatives I manually collect the 
names of the representatives of the group’s regional cooperatives from the annual 
reports of the cooperatives. Overall, the S Group dataset consists of 18,612 names of the 
representatives that have been members of a council of representatives, supervisory 
board or board of directors between 1996 and 2009.  
The annual reports of the regional cooperatives are collected from the archive of the 
National Library, which contains almost all annual reports of the regional cooperatives 
during the observation period. For the years for which I am not able to find the annual 
report, the composition of the council of representatives cannot be determined. 
However, I am able to collect the names of the members of boards of directors and 
supervisory boards of the regional cooperatives for these missing years from the 
database of National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland. Thus, my sample 
includes the names of the members of the boards of directors and supervisory boards for 
each regional cooperative for all the analyzed years, but the information on the members 
of councils of representatives is missing for certain years and regional cooperatives for 
which the annual reports are not available. These missing observations vary between 
one and four regional cooperatives per year. It should also be noted that all regional 
cooperatives do not provide the changes in the composition of the representative organs 
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that occur during the financial year, thus I am not able to track all changes in the 
member base. However, for those years that this data is available, no major changes 
seem to occur during the fiscal year. For the years and regional cooperatives for which I 
am able to track the changes, I decide to use the year-end compositions of governance 
organs in my analysis. 
5.5.1.2 Retrieval of municipal politicians data 
To detect the political connections of S Group, I also collect the names of municipal 
politicians from the municipalities that belong to the regional cooperatives’ operating 
areas. Before being able to collect the names, I first need to identify which 
municipalities belong to the operating area of each regional cooperative. To start, I 
collect a list of all the Finnish municipalities that existed in 1996 from the database of 
Statistics Finland to be used as a base list. In 1996, 455 municipalities existed, but 
municipal elections were held only in 436 municipalities as 16 municipalities are 
located in the Åland islands and three municipal mergers came into force from the 
beginning of 1997. Thus my original sample consists of 436 municipalities, which I 
match to the operating areas of regional and local cooperatives based on the information 
provided by the annual reports of the regional cooperatives, a book on S Group’s history 
(Herranen 2004) and press releases. If I am unable to determine the correct regional 
cooperative for a specific municipality from these sources, I include the municipality to 
the regional cooperative that has opened retail trade units in that municipality, since the 
regional cooperatives mainly provide services within their own operating area
75
. In 
1996, there were 21 local cooperatives
76
 of which nine are identified to operate either in 
the Åland islands or only in specific areas within municipalities. The operating areas of 
the remaining 12 local cooperatives are excluded from the sample, which decreases the 
sample size to 417 municipalities.  
After identifying the municipalities that belong to the operating areas of regional 
cooperatives, I collect the names of municipal politicians for these municipalities. To 
determine whether S Group’s representatives are also active in municipal councils I 
collect the names of all municipal councilors in each municipality between 1997 and 
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2009. Thus my examination period includes the municipal elections of the years 1996, 
2000, 2004 and 2008. Since the municipal elections of the year 1996 are the first 
municipal elections for which the election results are provided in electronic form, I am 
not able to analyze the political connections between S Group and municipal councils in 
1996. The office term starts in the year following the elections, thus to analyze the year 
1996 I would need the results from the elections of the year 1992 which are not 
provided in electronic form. The analysis for the year 1996 is conducted on the 
municipal board and committee level. 
The names of municipal councilors are obtained from the municipal election results and 
therefore my data does not take into account changes in the composition of the councils 
during the office period. The municipal election results are obtained from the database 
of Statistics Finland. The Statistics Finland records include, inter alia, the names of 
elected municipal councilors, their home municipalities, party and the number of votes 
received. The number of elected municipal councilors has decreased during my 
examination period due to municipal mergers. In 2008, 10,412 municipal councilors 
were elected, whereas in 1996 the corresponding figure was 12,482 (Statistics Finland, 
2011). As each year is analyzed separately during the observation period between 1996 
and 2009 in the panel data, the final dataset contains 150,926 observations of municipal 
councilor names.  
In addition to municipal councils, I need to collect the names of municipal board 
members and members of the committees selected for the analysis. Data on the 
composition of these organs is not collected in a centralized manner, and I therefore 
need to collect the information directly from Finnish municipalities. In November 2011, 
I asked all continental Finnish municipalities to provide the names of the members of 
their municipal board and selected committees from 1996 to 2009. Specifically, the 
municipalities were asked to provide the names of the members of their municipal 
board, the building committee, the committee that is in charge of the usage of the 
municipality’s land area and buildings, and the education and social committees. In the 
case the municipality had merged with other municipalities during the examination 
period, I also asked the information for the merged municipalities. I did not particularly 
ask the municipalities to include the changes in the composition of the organs, since I 
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learned that it would require manual work and would thus likely decrease the response 
rate and my sample size remarkably. For the municipalities that provided the changes in 
the composition of the member bases of the requested organs, I take the changes into 
account and use the year-end composition of the decision making bodies to measure the 
political connections each year.    
In 2011, there were 336 municipalities of which 16 were located in the Åland islands. 
The remaining 320 municipalities were approached with the information request 
described above. The request was sent by email to the person considered the most 
appropriate for the purposes of providing the data, i.e. typically the person in charge of 
the municipality’s registry or archive. The appropriate contact details were collected 
from the municipalities’ websites. In case the contact information used was not up-to-
date or the letter was not sent to the right person, it is possible that some municipalities 
did not receive the request. The requested information was provided by 183 
municipalities, in addition to which the information for 76 merged municipalities was 
also provided, resulting in a total sample of 259 municipalities. The final sample of the 
members of the municipal boards and the committees consists of 118,142 names. These 
names were manually collected and typed from the material provided by the 
municipalities. This exercise required a considerable amount of time, which also implies 
that despite meticulous efforts it is probable that the dataset contains a certain degree of 
spelling errors.  
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the municipalities’ responses to my information 
request. The average size and population density of the municipalities that provided the 
information is somewhat lower than the figures for the group that did not provide the 
information. This suggests that the largest cities were not as active as smaller ones in 
providing the information. It is also noteworthy that the municipalities that provided the 
requested information were more connected to S Group through municipal councilors 
than those who did not provide the information. The share of connected politicians is 
0.8 percentage points higher in the municipalities that provided the information. In 
2009, a pure new investment ABC service station store was located in 41 of the 
municipalities that provided the requested information. Overall, there seem to be no 
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major differences between the two groups that would affect the generalization of my 
results.  
Table 4 Summary statistics for information request responses 
 
5.5.1.3 Descriptive statistics for the political connections data 
After collecting the names of S Group’s regional cooperatives’ representatives and the 
municipal politicians of the relevant municipalities, I cross-reference the names to 
detect political connections. Table 5 illustrates the development of political connections 
between S Group and municipal councils during the examination period as well as 
shows the distribution of ABC service station stores by regional cooperative. In Table 5 
the level of political connection is measured by comparing the number of council of 
representatives, board of directors and supervisory board members who are also 
municipal councilors to the total number of representatives in the corresponding 
S Group organs. The table shows that the political connections of S Group’s regional 
cooperatives are widespread and that the average and median levels of political 
connection have clearly increased from 1997 to 2009. In 2009, on average 23% of the 
representatives of regional cooperatives were also municipal councilors, while in 1997 
the corresponding figure was 16%.  
The data also shows that there are clear differences in the amount of political 
connections between regional cooperatives. In 2009, Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto, the 
Variable N Mean N Mean
ABC service station stores 41 18
Connected municipality 128 135
% of connected municipal council members 189 3.2% 136 2.4%
% of votes of connected municipal councilors 189 2.6% 136 1.9%
Habitants 189 15,153 136 17,781
Land area (km
2
) 189 868 136 1,001
Population density (pop/km
2
) 189 36 136 85
Information not provided N=136Information provided N=189
This table provides summary statistics on municipalities according to their response to the information request. The table is
based on the municipal structure and statistics of the year 2009. Actual responses were received from 183 municipalities,
which in my sample corresponds to 189 municipalities in 2009 due to municipal mergers. ABC service station stores include
only the units that have been pure new investments. Connected municipality is defined as a municipality where at least one
municipal councilor is also a member of a regional cooperative's council of representatives, board of directors or supervisory
board. Connected councilor is defined as a person who is also a member of a regional cooperative's council of
representatives, board of directors or supervisory board.
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largest of the regional cooperatives, was the most connected with more than half of its 
representatives having a dual role as municipal councilors. On the other end, the 
regional cooperatives that do not have a council of representatives were clearly less 
connected: for instance, in Etelä-Karjalan Osuuskauppa, which was the least connected, 
only 4% of the representatives were connected to municipal councils in 2009. As the 
table illustrates, each of the regional cooperatives operates at least one ABC service 
station store. The amount of ABC service station stores operated by regional 
cooperatives varies between one and ten. Most of the ABC service station stores are 
located in the operating area of Etelä-Pohjanmaan Osuuskauppa, which operates almost 
10% of all ABC service station stores. In 2009, every fifth representative of Etelä-
Pohjanmaan Osuuskauppa also had a dual role as a municipal councilor. 
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Table 5 Development of political connections 1997-2009 
Group description Regional cooperative
Home 
municipality
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
ABC service 
station stores
Andelslaget Varuboden Kirkkonummi 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 17% 27% 27% 25% 23% 1
Etelä-Pohjanmaan Osuuskauppa Seinäjoki 18% 17% 16% 14% 20% 20% 18% 20% 26% 25% 25% 24% 20% 10
Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto Helsinki 26% 26% 36% 38% 40% 40% 43% 46% 44% 46% 51% 58% 52% 6
Keskimaa Osk Jyväskylä 18% 19% 19% 19% 21% 21% 20% 21% 29% 31% 32% 31% 29% 6
Koillismaan Osuuskauppa Kuusamo 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 9% 10% 9% 9% 12% 3
Osuuskauppa Hämeenmaa Lahti 18% 21% 25% 26% 15% 15% 18% 19% 33% 33% 32% 33% 34% 9
Osuuskauppa KPO Kokkola 23% 25% 25% 21% 19% 20% 20% 21% 23% 23% 23% 28% 26% 7
Osuuskauppa Maakunta Kajaani 29% 27% 26% 32% 30% 25% 25% 18% 24% 24% 24% 22% 30% 1
Osuuskauppa Osla Handelslag Porvoo 11% 9% 9% 9% 9% 17% 15% 15% 15% 16% 16% 16% 11% 1
Osuuskauppa Seutu Lohja 8% 8% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m
Osuuskauppa Ympyrä Hamina 17% 18% 18% 15% 14% 12% 12% 12% 18% 18% 18% 18% 21% 3
Osuuskauppa Ympäristö Kouvola 10% 11% 10% 20% 17% 19% 19% 23% 28% 30% 30% 28% 19% 6
Pohjois-Karjalan Osuuskauppa Joensuu 19% 18% 18% 23% 21% 21% 21% 23% 24% 24% 24% 21% 24% 5
Suur-Seudun Osuuskauppa Salo n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m 23% 22% 22% 22% 23% 18% 80
Etelä-Karjalan Osuuskauppa Lappeenranta 4% 4% 0% 0% 12% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 4% 3
Jukolan Osuuskauppa Nurmes 4% 4% 4% 4% 0% 4% 4% 4% 8% 8% 8% 12% 12% 20
Osuuskauppa Arina Oulu 27% 31% 38% 38% 28% 39% 39% 41% 34% 38% 38% 37% 32% 8
Osuuskauppa Keula Rauma 5% 10% 10% 10% 8% 6% 8% 8% 8% 20% 22% 23% 27% 3
Osuuskauppa PeeÄssä Kuopio 22% 21% 21% 26% 24% 24% 24% 30% 29% 30% 27% 12% 12% 7
Pirkanmaan Osuuskauppa Tampere 20% 20% 13% 18% 14% 14% 14% 22% 20% 21% 21% 28% 26% 6
Salon Seudun Osuuskauppa Salo 20% 20% 11% 10% 4% 4% 8% n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m n/m
Satakunnan Osuuskauppa Pori 10% 9% 9% 9% 19% 21% 20% 20% 18% 18% 18% 18% 33% 3
Osuuskauppa Suur-Savo Mikkeli 20% 21% 21% 21% 16% 16% 11% 19% 21% 20% 21% 26% 32% 7
Turun Osuuskauppa Turku 18% 19% 19% 20% 16% 16% 20% 20% 23% 23% 23% 37% 39% 4
Mean 16% 16% 16% 17% 16% 17% 17% 19% 22% 23% 24% 25% 23% 5
Median 18% 18% 18% 19% 15% 16% 18% 20% 22% 23% 23% 24% 26% 5
Standard deviation 7% 7% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 9% 9% 10% 11% 11% 3
Min 4% 4% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 4% 8% 8% 8% 8% 4% 1
Max 29% 27% 36% 38% 40% 40% 43% 46% 44% 46% 51% 58% 52% 10
Panel A: 
Regional cooperatives with complete 
information
Panel B: 
Regional cooperatives that did not have a 
council of representatives
Panel C: 
Regional cooperatives with council of 
representatives information missing for at 
least one year
This table presents the connected representatives of S Group's regional cooperatives (council of representatives, board of directors and supervisory board) as a fraction of the total members of the corresponding organs between
1997 and 2009. The table only measures connections to municipal councils. The regional cooperatives are divided into three panels according to their management structure and the availability of data. All the cooperatives in Panel A
have a council of representatives and information of the council of representatives members is available for all the years examined. In Panel B, a council of representatives has not been part of the administration structure of the
regional cooperatives during the examination period. Panel C shows regional cooperatives with incomplete information of the members in the council of representatives. In Panel C, the relative number of connected members is
calculated based on known members (i.e. some of the years include only the connections of the members of supervisory board and board of directors). n/m indicates that the regional cooperative has merged with other regional
cooperative or has not yet started operations. The statistical figures below the table include only regional cooperatives with complete information in a given year. The table also presents the distribution of ABC service station stores in
March 2012 based on the regional cooperative structure of 2009. 
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Table 6 describes the political connections separately for the ABC service station store 
municipalities and for municipalities in which no ABC service station store has been 
opened in the second calendar year following the measurement of political connection. 
The ABC service station store municipalities include only the municipalities in which 
the units are pure new investments. The average absolute number of connected 
municipal councilors, members of municipal board and irrelevant committees is 
statistically significantly higher in the ABC service station store municipalities. ABC 
service station stores’ stronger presence in larger cities partly explains the higher 
absolute number of connected members. However, when measuring the average relative 
number of connected members, the effect of municipality size is partly taken into 
account. The average relative amount of connected members is also statistically 
significantly higher in ABC service station store municipalities, except when measuring 
the connections to relevant committees. Both t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests 
support the conclusion that political connections are significantly higher in the ABC 
service station store municipalities than in the municipalities in which no pure new 
investment ABC service station stores are located.  
Table 6 also illustrates that both the absolute and relative numbers of connected 
members in relevant committees are essentially equal in both panels, but the 
connections in irrelevant committees are significantly higher in the ABC service station 
store municipalities. Moreover, the connections are more common in irrelevant 
committees than in relevant committees in both types of municipalities. The relatively 
higher representation of S Group representatives in irrelevant committees (education 
and social committees) is a curious result. A member of these committees is less likely 
to be able to use decision power that would be of significant value to the S group. 
Although one may only speculate of the motivation of the S Group affiliated members 
of these committees, it is possible that they participate both in municipality politics and 
in S Group’s activities simply because they are unusually active citizens eager to 
participate in decision making, regardless of whether that happens at the municipality or 
S Group level. Education and social committees can be argued to have a more wide-
ranging role in local decision making than committees focusing mainly on zoning and 
construction decisions, so active citizens may wish to seek representation in these 
committees to maximize their overall policy influence. 
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Table 6 Summary statistics for political connections 
 
Measures for political connections N Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Min Max N Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Min Max
Number of connections in municipal council 64 2.7 1.0 4.4 0 25 5,107 0.7 0.0 1.7 0 27 (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Number of connections in municipal board 44 0.8 0.0 1.2 0 5 3,005 0.3 0.0 0.7 0 6 (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Number of connections in relevant committee 43 0.2 0.0 0.7 0 4 2,999 0.2 0.0 0.5 0 6 (0.337) (0.524)
Number of connections in irrelevant committee 44 0.5 0.0 1.1 0 6 3,055 0.2 0.0 0.5 0 6 (0.000)*** (0.003)***
Connected municipal councilors (%) 64 5.0% 2.9% 6.4% 0.0% 29.4% 5,107 1.9% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 31.8% (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Connected municipal board members (%) 44 7.1% 0.0% 11.0% 0.0% 45.0% 3,005 2.9% 0.0% 6.5% 0.0% 56.0% (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Connected relevant committee members (%) 43 1.2% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 14.0% 2,999 1.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 25.0% (0.679) (0.529)
Connected irrelevant committee members (%) 44 2.6% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 25.0% 3,055 1.2% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 25.0% (0.001)*** (0.006)***
Votes of connected municipal councilors (%) 64 3.7% 2.1% 4.7% 0.0% 24.2% 5,107 1.5% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 31.7% (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Municipality's share of the connected 
representatives of its regional cooperative
63 15.0% 8.0% 19.0% 0.0% 75.0% 5,074 5.5% 0.0% 12.1% 0.0% 100.0% (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Municipality's share of votes of the share of 
votes of connected representatives of its 
regional cooperative
63 10.7% 8.0% 13.1% 0.0% 62.0% 5,074 5.6% 0.0% 11.8% 0.0% 100.0%
N % of total N % of total 
Connected municipal council 42 65.6% 1,867 36.6%
Connected municipal board 18 40.9% 627 20.9%
Connected relevant committee 7 16.3% 388 12.9%
Connected irrelevant committee 14 31.8% 488 16.0%
This table presents the summary statistics of the measures of political connections between S Group representatives and municipal politicians. The political connections are measured between the members of the
regional cooperatives' council of representatives, supervisory board, board of directors, and different municipal management bodies, including municipal councils, municipal boards, and selected committees. Relevant
committees include committees that are relevant to building and zoning decisions, whereas irrelevant committees include education and social committees. The sample includes 64 pure new ABC service station stores
that were opened between 1998 and 2010. The sample size is smaller than 64 units when the connections to municipal boards and committees are measured, since all Finnish municipalities did not provide the
information on the members of the corresponding organs. The level of connections is analysed separately for municipalities in which an ABC service station store is built in the second calendar year following the
measurement of political connections (Panel A) and for those in which no ABC service station store is built (Panel B). % of total refers to the total number of observations in the corresponding group (ABC built vs.
ABC not built). P-values for t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: ABC built in the second year Panel B: ABC not built in the second year t-test 
differences 
in means
Wilcoxon-
Mann-
Whitney test
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5.5.2 ABC service station store and competitors data 
In addition to municipality and S Group representative information, I use a dataset 
collected from the Business Register of Statistics Finland that contains detailed 
information of all retail trade units in Finland. The data is collected for the period 
between 2001 and 2009. I use the dataset to determine the municipalities where ABC 
service stations stores are located. The dataset also contains establishment dates of the 
units that enable me to detect the opening years for ABC service station stores. 
Moreover, it contains employee and location information of all retail trade units in 
Finland. This data is used to analyze the level of competition on the municipal level and 
to analyze the market share of ABC service station stores. The data also contains XY-
coordinates that help me to collect traffic amount data from the Finnish Transport 
Agency. The actual traffic amount data is collected from the Digiroad 2010 software 
package of the Finnish Transport Agency. 
As the Business Register data contains the establishment dates of all retail trade units, I 
use this information to identify the units that have been pure new investments. The 
Business Register data is reported so that the starting date of an establishment's 
operation does not change if the establishment and its activities are transferred from one 
enterprise to another. Therefore, the units whose establishment date is before their 
opening year as an ABC service station store are principally considered to be renovated 
units. However, as a robustness check I decide to manually collect the opening years of 
ABC service stations for all units and cross-reference the information with the 
information provided by the Business Register of Statistics Finland. I go through the 
annual reports of the regional cooperatives, press releases and newspaper articles on the 
openings of new ABC service stations stores to identify and separate the stations that 
are pure new investments and those that have been renovated from existing units. I am 
able to identify 64 service station stores that have been pure new investments. It is 
important to notice that the importance of political connections from the zoning process 
point of view is limited for renovated units. In these cases the zoning and building 
decisions are likely to include at the most changes in local detailed plans and building 
permits. Thus, as discussed earlier I mainly focus only on the units that are pure new 
investments in my empirical analysis.  
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The first ABC service station store was opened in December 1998. By 2010, the ABC 
service station store chain had extended to 108 units. During 2004, which was the 
strongest growth year, S Group opened 21 service stations. Between 1999 and 2009, the 
compounded annual growth rate of the ABC service station stores was 30%. Figure 6 
illustrates how the political connections of the regional cooperatives have developed in 
comparison to the growth of the ABC service station store chain.  
Figure 5 Political connections and service station stores 
 
Table 7 provides summary statistics separately for ABC service station store 
municipalities and municipalities with no ABC service station store in 2010. The table 
illustrates that on average ABC service station store municipalities are larger in terms of 
population. Both the median and average population densities are also higher for ABC 
service station store municipalities than for municipalities with no ABC service station 
stores. ABC service station stores are also located in municipalities with higher highway 
traffic amounts. Perhaps surprisingly, ABC service station stores seem to be located in 
municipalities associated with higher levels of competition. Since the level of 
competition is higher in larger municipalities, the smaller Herfindahl index of ABC 
service station municipalities is likely to be partly explained by ABC service station 
stores’ stronger presence in larger municipalities.  
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Table 7 Municipality level summary statistics 
 
Table 7 also includes the traffic amounts for ABC service station stores and other 
service station stores that can be considered as competitors for ABC. In Table 7, the 
traffic amount refers to the highest average daily traffic amount within a radius of 500 
meters from the unit. The average daily traffic amounts are clearly higher near ABC 
service station stores than near competing service station stores.  
The municipality level statistics presented in Table 7 are collected to control for other 
factors that might explain the location of an ABC service station store. The statistics, 
such as land area, population density and population, are obtained from the database of 
Statistics Finland, the National Land Survey of Finland and the Association of Finnish 
Local and Regional Authorities. Information of the Finnish road network is obtained 
from the Finnish Transport Agency. 
Variable
N Mean Median
Standard 
deviation
Min Max
Panel A: ABC service station store municipalities
Population 64 50,830 19,412 103,060 1,315 568,531
Land area (km
2
) 64 674 352 889 36 5,004
Population density (pop/km
2
) 64 261 40,115 561 2 3,050
Highway kilometers 61 45 39 32 0 148
Highway traffic amounts 61 10,208 6,812 10,137 0 46,811
Number of service and automated filling stations 58 10 5 13 1 77
Herfindahl index (grocery stores and service stations) 58 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.29
Herfindahl index (service stations) 58 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.24
ABC traffic amounts 228 9,190 9,068 5,969 0 31,769
Competitor traffic amounts 215 5,573 5,576 3,442 0 18,512
Panel B: Municipalities with no ABC service station store
Population 237 8,520 4,761 15,922 801 175,582
Land area (km
2
) 237 911 491 1,662 6 15,052
Population density (pop/km
2
) 237 35 10 132 0.19 1,453
Highway kilometers 224 22 16 27 0 200
Highway traffic amounts 224 4,511 2,692 6,922 0 52,591
Number of service and automated filling stations 236 3 2 3 0 31
Herfindahl index (grocery stores and service stations) 237 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.01 1.00
Herfindahl index (service stations) 218 0.64 0.50 0.30 0.09 1.00
This table provides summary statistics for two groups of municipalities: Panel A displays municipalities that have at least one ABC
service station store that has been a pure new investment; Panel B shows municipalities that did not have pure new investment
ABC service station stores in 2010. The statistics for ABC service station store municipalities are from two calendar years before
an ABC service station store was opened. The statistics for the muninicipalities in which no ABC service station store was located
in 2010 are obtained from the year 2009. Highway traffic amounts refer to average daily traffic amounts measured at the
municipality level for the municipalities that existed in 2010. ABC and competitor traffic amounts are the highest average daily traffic
amounts within a radius of 500 metres from the unit. Competitor traffic amounts refer to the traffic amounts of service station stores
that do not belong to the ABC chain. Zero traffic amount means that the unit is not located along highway. Traffic amounts sample
includes municipalities where an ABC service station store that has been a pure new investment is located. 
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5.5.3 Zoning decisions data 
To measure the political connections of the regional cooperatives at a moment that is 
relevant to the zoning process of an ABC service station store, I collect the plan 
approval dates for ABC service stations. I use the plan approval dates of ABC service 
station stores to determine the time lag between plan approval date and the actual 
opening date of the stations. I collect the plan approval dates from the database of 
National Land Survey of Finland. However, only the approval date of the current local 
detailed plan is provided in the database. Thus, if the plan has been changed after the 
opening of an ABC service station store, I am not able to detect the original zoning date 
for the unit. I am able to detect the actual plan approval date for 41 of 64 units that have 
been pure new investments.  
As can be seen from Figure 5, most of these ABC service station stores are opened 
during the first or second calendar year following plan approval. Since I am unable to 
detect the exact plan approval dates for each ABC service station store, I use Figure 5 to 
make the assumption that all ABC service station stores are opened within one or two 
calendar years from their plan approval date. Thus, in the empirical part political 
connections are measured with lags of one or two calendar years from the potential 
opening of an ABC service station store.  
Figure 6 Lag between plan approval and opening date  
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However, the exact plan approval date might not be the most interesting moment in the 
process to analyze, since the potential effect of political connections can occur in 
several stages of the zoning process; before, during and at the plan approval stage. In 
fact, Finnish law prevents any party that has an interest in the zoning process to 
participate in the decision making
77
. Thus, the effect that political connections 
potentially have on zoning decisions is likely to occur in more indirect ways and in 
particular before actual plan approval. Therefore, in addition to measuring political 
connections at the plan approval date, I also measure the connections during the 
planning phase of the zoning process.  
To be able to measure the connections during the planning phase, I need to determine 
the average duration of the zoning processes. The duration used in this thesis is 10 
months, which is based on finding by Rinkinen (2007), who reports this as the median 
duration of the local detailed plan process in 54 Finnish municipalities between 2004 
and 2005. As discussed, the lags of one and two years from the opening year are used as 
a proxy for the plan approval year. To measure the political connections during the 
zoning process, I subtract the average zoning period of 10 months from the plan 
approval date, and conclude that the zoning processes have started two to three calendar 
years before the opening year. Thus, in addition to measuring the political connections 
one and two calendar years before the opening of an ABC service station store, I also 
measure them with a three-year lag.  
                                                 
77
 Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003), Chapter 5 Section 27-30. 
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6 Results 
This section presents the results of my thesis. I begin by examining the relationship 
between S Group’s political connections and municipalities’ zoning decisions 
concerning ABC service station stores. Furthermore, I study the group’s political 
connections in the context of the market share of ABC service station stores.  
6.1 Zoning decisions 
In this section, I present the results of my analysis on the relationship between S 
Group’s political connections and the zoning decisions of ABC service station stores. 
First, I analyze how S Group’s political connections are associated with the zoning 
decision making by measuring the political connections on the municipal level. After 
that I analyze whether ABC service station stores are more likely to be located in 
municipalities that have a higher share of the regional cooperative’s political 
connections. This is achieved by measuring the municipality’s political connections in 
relation to the connections of other municipalities belonging to the same regional 
cooperative. In this section, my analysis focuses only on the ABC service station stores 
that have been pure new investments. 
6.1.1 Political connections of a municipality 
To analyze my first research question (i.e. 1A) on the relationship between the political 
connections of S Group and zoning decisions of ABC service station stores, I first 
complete several cross-tabulations and after that employ Probit regression analysis. I 
begin by cross-tabulating my observations to gain a deeper understanding of the data 
and the nature of the analyzed phenomenon. It is noteworthy that reliable conclusions 
about causal relationships cannot be drawn from the univariate analysis, since it ignores 
important factors that may also explain the zoning decisions of ABC service station 
stores.  
In Table 8, I cross-tabulate the strength of the political connections of S Group’s 
representatives and a variable which measures whether an ABC service station store is 
built in the municipality in the second calendar year following the measurement of the 
connection. I separately measure the political connections of municipal councils, 
municipal boards, and committees. I also use the share of votes received by the 
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municipality’s connected municipal councilors in municipal elections as a proxy for the 
power that the connected members potentially have in local decision making. I further 
divide the connected municipalities into quartiles according to the fraction of connected 
members. Municipalities that are not connected to S Group are presented separately in 
the unconnected group. The quartiles are not exactly same in size due to the nature of 
the data
78
.  
As can be seen from Table 8, there is no monotonic relationship between the strength of 
political connection and opening of an ABC service station store in a municipality. The 
likelihood that an ABC service station store is opened in a municipality does not 
monotonically increase with the strength of the connections in municipal councils, 
municipal boards and the selected committees. Still, the service station stores seem to be 
more likely opened in municipalities where political connections exist than in 
unconnected municipalities. 
In Panel A of Table 8, I analyze the regional cooperatives’ connections to municipal 
councils. The proportional test indicates that the share of municipalities in which an 
ABC service station store is opened in the second calendar year following the 
measurement of political connections is statistically significantly higher in the most 
connected quartile than in the unconnected group. In the most connected quartile an 
ABC service station store is opened in 4.0% of the municipality years, while the same 
figure is only 0.7% in the unconnected group. However, perhaps because of the noise 
arising from a relatively small number of zoning decisions, the relationship is not 
monotonic. In the first quartile the share of municipalities where an ABC service station 
store is opened is higher than in the second and third quartile. Overall, the results do not 
support the view that the likelihood that an ABC service station store is zoned and 
opened in a municipality would monotonically increase with the strength of the political 
connections. It seems that the actual existence of political connections is a more 
important factor. 
                                                 
78
 The quartiles are different in size for three reasons. First, the Finnish law limits the size of municipal 
councils to 11 discrete options depending on the population of a municipality. Second, it can be observed 
that the number of members in municipal boards and committees varies only slightly between 
municipalities. Third, there is a relatively little variation in the absolute number of connected S Group 
representatives. The small variation in the member size and in the absolute number of connected persons 
lead to that the observed fractions of connected members often have relatively similar discrete values. 
This high frequency of similar values explains the differently sized quartiles. 
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Table 8 Cross-tabulation of zoning decisions and political connections 1A  
Organ Strength of connection: Unconnected
Lowest 
connection 
(1
st
 quartile)
2
nd
3
rd
Strongest 
connection 
(4
th
 quartile)
Total 
connected
Total 
observations
ABC built 19 11 8 6 17 42 61
% of total 0.7% 2.4% 1.7% 1.4% 4.0% 2.3% 1.4%
Total observations 2,644 468 463 443 427 1,801 4,445
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.000)***
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.000)***
ABC built 23 7 2 1 8 18 41
% of total 1.1% 4.3% 1.0% 1.0% 5.3% 2.9% 1.6%
Total observations 2,031 163 201 97 151 612 2,643
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.000)***
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.000)***
ABC built 33 3 3 0 1 7 40
% of total 1.5% 2.0% 3.1% 0.0% 1.2% 1.8% 1.5%
Total observations 2,247 152 96 55 87 390 2,637
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.807)
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.633)
ABC built 27 6 3 1 4 14 41
% of total 1.2% 5.0% 2.2% 0.9% 3.2% 2.9% 1.5%
Total observations 2,198 121 136 106 125 488 2,686
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.008)***
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.062)*
ABC built 19 10 4 12 16 n/m 61
% of total 0.7% 2.3% 0.9% 2.6% 3.4% 1.4%
Total observations 2,646 428 442 456 473 n/m 4,445
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.000)***
Panel E: Share of municipality's 
votes received by connected 
councilors
Panel A:
Municipal council
This table presents the results of cross-tabulation of the members of a municipal council (Panel A), municipal board (Panel B), committees relevant to building and zoning decisions (Panel C) and
irrelevant committees (Panel D), who are also representatives of S Group (connected) as a fraction of total members of the corresponding organs, and a variable which measures whether an ABC service
station store is built in the municipality in the second calendar year following the measurement of the connection. The share of votes received by connected municipal councilors in municipal elections is
used to measure the level of connection in Panel E. The municipalities are divided into the zero-group (unconnected) and connected group based on their level of connections. The connected group is
divided into quartiles that are not same in size due to nature of the data. The sample includes only the ABC service station stores that are pure new investments. Municipalities are only included in the
sample for those years for which information on the respective S Group regional cooperative's members of the council of representatives is available. In Panels B, C and D, the cross-tabulation for
municipal boards and relevant committees include only the municipalities that have provided the information. P-values for a proportional test between the connected and unconnected municipalities and for 
a test between the highest quartile and unconnected group are presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel C:
Relevant committees
Panel B:
Municipal board
Panel D:
Irrelevant committees
Quartiles according to the level of connection
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Similar results are obtained when the cross-tabulation is conducted using the relative 
number of connected members in municipal boards (Panel B). In the most connected 
quartile, an ABC service station store is opened in 5.3% of analyzed municipality years, 
whereas in the unconnected group the corresponding figure is only 1.1%. However, it is 
noteworthy that the sample size is significantly smaller when the analysis is done on a 
municipal board level due to the limited availability of data. Since the ABC built 
dummy variable takes a value of one only in 41 observations altogether, the amount of 
observations in certain quartiles is remarkably small. Therefore these results have to be 
interpreted cautiously.  
When analyzing connections in committees relevant to zoning and construction 
decisions (Panel C), I do not find a statistically significant difference between the most 
connected quartile and the unconnected group. The proportion of ABC service station 
store municipalities is significantly higher in the first and second quartiles than in the 
two highest quartiles. There is no statistically significant difference between the 
connected and unconnected group either. The results suggest that connections in the 
committees relevant to zoning and building decisions are not statistically significantly 
associated with the likelihood that an ABC service station store is opened in a 
municipality. 
Interestingly, the proportional test of irrelevant committees (education and social 
committee) provides evidence of a statistically significant difference between the most 
connected quartile and unconnected group, as well as between the unconnected and 
connected municipalities (Panel D). One could expect that the effect the irrelevant 
committees have on zoning decisions is smaller than that of relevant committees, since 
the means through which the connections in irrelevant committees can affect zoning 
decisions are more indirect. The simultaneous membership of representatives in both 
relevant and irrelevant committees might affect the results, but similar findings are 
nevertheless obtained after excluding persons with such dual roles. One reason for the 
result might also be that the S Group representatives are relatively more represented in 
irrelevant committees than in relevant committees, as is illustrated in the descriptive 
statistics on political connections.  
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In Panel E of Table 8, the share of votes received by the connected municipal councilors 
is employed to measure the relative political power that connected members are 
assumed to have in the decision making of the governance bodies. The proportional test 
that uses this measure for political connections indicates that there is again a statistically 
significant difference in the proportion of ABC service station store municipalities 
between the most connected quartile and the unconnected group. Again the relationship 
is not monotonic as the proportion of ABC service station store municipalities is smaller 
in the second than in the first quartile.  
Based on the cross-tabulation, ABC service station stores are more likely to be opened 
in municipalities where political connections exist than in unconnected municipalities. 
However, the likelihood of opening of an ABC service station store does not increase 
monotonically with the strength of the political connection. I measure the political 
connections also with one- and three-year lags from the potential opening of an ABC 
service station store, but the results are similar to those presented here. I also cross-
tabulate the observations by excluding municipalities from the sample after an ABC 
service station store has been opened in them. This is done because usually only one 
ABC service station store is built in a municipality, except in larger cities. The results 
for this subsample are essentially similar to those presented here. Overall, very limited 
interpretations can be drawn from the cross-tabulations, since other variables that are 
related to zoning decisions cannot be controlled for. The results are likely to be 
especially affected by the sizes of analyzed municipalities. Therefore, I next employ a 
multivariate regression analysis that allows me to control for these potential explanatory 
factors. 
Table 9 presents the results of the Probit regression on the zoning decisions of ABC 
service station stores that are pure new investments. In Table 9, I measure political 
connections by using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if in a given 
municipality at least one representative of S Group's regional cooperatives’ councils of 
representatives, boards of directors or supervisory boards is a member in the municipal 
council, municipal board or committees. Similar to the cross-tabulation, the political 
connection is measured with a two-year lag from the potential opening of an ABC 
service station store. I report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for 
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clustering at the municipality level to ensure that autocorrelation does not affect the t-
values
79
. Moreover, time fixed effects are included in the regressions to control for year 
specific factors.  
The results from the regression analysis do not support the conclusion that S Group’s 
political connections have systematically affected the zoning decisions of its ABC 
service station stores. The coefficients of the political connection dummies are 
insignificant in all but one of the regression specifications: the coefficient of the 
political connection dummy is weakly significant only when using relevant committees 
to measure political connections and when the distance to the nearest ABC service 
station store municipality is not controlled for. The negative coefficient indicates that 
the connections in relevant committees are actually associated with a decrease in the 
likelihood that an ABC service station store is opened. However, the sign of the 
coefficient is likely to be a chance result more than an implication of a real relationship 
for several reasons. First, the result does not hold after controlling for all the relevant 
factors. Second, the result is significant only at a relatively low confidence level. Third, 
the significance of the result disappears when political connections are measured with 
one- and three-year lags. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Probit analysis 
presented in Table 9 does not imply a statistically significant relationship between the 
existence of S group’s political connections and the zoning decisions of ABC service 
station stores. It should be noted that the number of opened ABC service station stores 
is relatively small in all the regression setups, and in particular when analyzing the 
connections to municipal boards and committees. Therefore, the results have to be 
interpreted cautiously. 
                                                 
79
 Autocorrelation is a frequent problem of panel data. A Wooldridge test is used to confirm the existence 
of the autocorrelation in the data. 
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Table 9 Regressions on zoning decisions 1A 
 
Expected 
effect
(I)
Coefficient
(I) 
Marginal effects 
(II) 
Coefficient
(II) 
Marginal effects 
(III)
Coefficient
(III) 
Marginal effects 
(IV) 
Coefficient
(IV) 
Marginal effects 
Dependent: ABC zoned
Connected municipal council + 0.084 0.001 0.071 0.001
(0.70) (0.68) (0.55) (0.53)
Connected municipal board + 0.010 0.001 0.122 0.004
(0.68) (0.62) (0.70) (0.62)
Connected relevant committee + -0.329* -0.003** -0.304 -0.007
(-1.70) (-2.10) (-1.21) (-1.53)
Connected irrelevant committee + 0.073 0.001 0.083 0.003
(0.48) (0.45) (0.46) (0.43)
Size of municipality + 0.310*** 0.005*** 0.389*** 0.007*** 0.288*** 0.004*** 0.347*** 0.010***
(7.12) (4.37) (7.48) (4.00) (3.58) (3.53) (3.75) (3.45)
Highway + 0.480** 0.007*** 0.395* 0.007** 0.439** 0.005** 0.345 0.009*
(2.42) (3.04) (1.89) (2.43) (2.01) (2.23) (1.49) (1.72)
Distance from ABC + 0.157** 0.003** 0.144* 0.004*
(2.44) (2.22) (1.75) (1.67)
Intercept -5.523*** -7.743*** -8.778*** -6.906***
(-12.72) (-8.47) (-12.27) (-5.72)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference probability 
ABC zoned (N)
Observations
Pseudo R
2
0.015 0.017 0.017 0.021
0.158 0.178 0.132 0.124
61 49 40 32
4,141 2,872 2,409 1,516
This table presents the results of the Probit regression on the zoning of ABC service station stores. All variables are measured at the municipal level. ABC zoned is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
an ABC service station store is opened in the municipality in the second calendar year following the measurement of political connection and control variables, and 0 otherwise. Political connections are measured
by using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one representative from S Group's regional cooperative's council of representatives, board of directors or supervisory board is a member of the
muncipality's municipal council, municipal board or selected committees. Size of municipality is the natural logarithm of the population of the municipality. Highway is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
municipality is located along a highway, and 0 otherwise. Distance from ABC is the natural logarithm of the distance in metres from the municipality to the nearest municipality where an ABC service station store is
located. All independent variables are measured with a two calendar year lag from the potential opening of an ABC service station store. The sample includes only the ABC service station stores that are pure new
investments. Municipalities are only included in the sample for those years for which information on the respective S Group regional cooperative's members of the council of representatives is available. Numbers in
the parenthesis are robust t-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. 
Panel A: Municipal council Panel B: Other organs
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In addition to measuring the mere existence of S Group’s political connections, I also 
employ variables that measure the strength of these connections in unreported 
regression specifications. To measure the strength of the political connections I compare 
the amount of connected members of municipal councils, municipal boards and 
committees, who are also representatives of S Group to the amount of total members of 
the corresponding organs (% of connected variable). As a robustness check I also 
measure the absolute number of connected members in the municipal decision making 
bodies. The political connection variables are insignificant in each of these regression 
specifications. These results do not support the view that the strength of S Group’s 
political connections would be associated with the zoning decisions.   
To ensure the robustness of my results I run several unreported additional regressions. 
Similar to the cross-tabulation, I also measure the connections with one- and three-year 
lags. The results show that political connections both one and three years before the 
potential opening of an ABC service station store are insignificant for all the organs 
analyzed. To detect whether dual roles of the municipal politicians in different decision 
making bodies affect the results, I run the regressions for several subsamples. First, I 
test whether dual roles of irrelevant committee members in municipal boards and 
relevant committees affect the results. Second, I analyze whether the board and 
committee members who are also municipal councilors, would have a different impact 
on the results than the members who are not elected councilors. As a final robustness 
check, I also run the regressions using OLS analysis. None of the results support the 
conclusion that the political connections of S Group would have systemically affected 
the zoning decisions of the group’s units. 
As robustness checks I also include municipality level competition (competition 
variable) to unreported regression models and replace the municipality size variable 
with population density. These additional variables are not included in the final models 
due to their high correlation with the municipality size variable as illustrated in the 
appendix. Moreover, the very high level of correlation between the competition and 
municipality size variables (negative correlation of 0.67) suggests that the competition 
variable measures more municipality size than the competition that would be relevant to 
my analysis. This conclusion is also supported by the negative coefficient of the 
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competition variable (Herfindahl-index) in the unreported regression analyses. It is 
likely that the negative coefficient of the competition variable stems from ABC service 
station stores’ stronger presence in larger municipalities, where the level of competition 
is higher. It is important to note that although competition has been recognized as an 
important determinant for location decisions of service stations (see Lähde 1999), there 
are two types of competition that are likely to be relevant for these decisions: (1) 
municipality level competition and (2) competition in different areas within a 
municipality. Based on my analyses, it seems that the second type of competition would 
be a more important factor for opening decisions of ABC service station stores. Since in 
this thesis I only analyze the differences between municipalities, I do not need to control 
for competition in different areas of municipalities and therefore, I decide not to include 
the competition variable to my final regression models. Additionally, I exclude the 
population density instead of the municipality size variable, since the explanatory power 
of the population density variable is weaker than the municipality size variable’s. 
The signs of the coefficients of the control variables included in the final analysis 
support the expected relationships and are statistically significant. Consistent with the 
view of Lähde (1999), I find that the amount of local population and a location along a 
highway are positively associated with an increase in the likelihood that an ABC service 
station store is located in a municipality. The marginal effects calculated at the means of 
the variables indicate that a municipality’s location along a highway increases the 
likelihood that an ABC service station store is opened in the municipality by 0.5-0.9%. 
The coefficient of the variable that measures the distance to the nearest municipality 
with an ABC service station store is positive in each of the panels, indicating that an 
increase in the distance is positively associated with the likelihood that an ABC service 
station store is located in a municipality. To conclude, my results indicate that the size 
of the local population, the road networks of the municipalities, and the existing ABC 
service station store network are statistically associated with the opening decisions of 
new ABC service station stores, just as expected. 
6.1.2 A municipality’s share of the regional cooperative’s connections 
Next, I focus on analyzing the second part of my first research question (i.e. 1B) and 
investigate whether the strength of a municipality’s connections to S Group, in relation 
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to the strength of connections of other municipalities belonging to the operating area of 
the same regional cooperative, is associated with the zoning decisions of ABC service 
station stores. The analysis differs from the preceding analysis in that previously I did 
not compare the political connections to other municipalities belonging to the same 
regional cooperative, but instead analyzed each municipality independently. Now I aim 
to examine whether ABC service station stores are more likely to be opened in 
municipalities that are more connected than others within the operating area of the same 
regional cooperative. I conduct the analysis only on the municipal council level to be 
able to also include the municipalities that did not provide information on their 
municipal board and committee members, and in this way ensure comparability 
between municipalities. Similar to the previous analysis, I begin my analysis by 
conducting several cross-tabulations, which are examined further by using the Probit 
regression analysis. 
In Table 10, I cross-tabulate the strength of a municipality’s political connections 
measured by the municipality’s share of the corresponding regional cooperative’s total 
connections to municipal councils, and a variable which measures whether an ABC 
service station store is opened in the municipality in the second calendar year following 
the measurement of political connections. In Panel A, I measure the strength of political 
connections by using the municipalities’ shares of all connected municipal councilors 
within the operating areas of their respective regional co-operatives. As Panel A 
illustrates, the proportion of the municipality years when an ABC service station store is 
opened in a municipality increases monotonically with the strength of the connections. 
The proportional test indicates that the proportion of ABC service station store 
municipalities is also statistically significantly higher in the highest quartile than in the 
unconnected group. In the most connected group, an ABC service station store is 
opened in 3.9% of observations, whereas the corresponding figure is only 0.7% in the 
unconnected group. The results suggest that a municipality’s share of total connections 
of a regional cooperative would be statistically significantly associated with the opening 
of an ABC service station store in the municipality. 
In Panel B, I measure the relative strength of a municipality’s connections by 
comparing the share of votes received by the connected municipal councilors of the 
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municipality to the total share of votes received by connected councilors within the 
operating area of the relevant regional cooperative. When measuring the strength of 
connections by using the share of votes, I do not find a monotonic relationship although 
the proportion of ABC service station stores is statistically significantly higher in the 
most connected quartile than in the unconnected group. In the most connected quartile 
an ABC service station store is opened in 2.9% of municipality years, while the 
corresponding figure is only 0.7% in the unconnected group. If the share of votes is 
considered as a measure of the power that a municipal politician potentially has in the 
municipal decision making, then the result does not support the view that there would 
be a monotonic relationship between the political power of connected members and the 
zoning decisions of ABC service station stores.  
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Table 10 Cross-tabulation of zoning decisions and political connections 1B 
Political connection Strength of connection: Unconnected
Lowest 
connection 
(1
st 
quartile)
2
nd
3
rd
Strongest 
connection 
(4
th 
quartile)
Total 
observations
ABC built 18 6 8 12 16 60
% of total 0.69% 1.23% 1.59% 3.02% 3.89% 1.36%
Total observations 2,610 488 504 398 411 4,411
Proportional test (unconnected 
vs. strongest connection)
(0.000)***
ABC built 18 9 9 12 12 60
% of total 0.69% 1.70% 1.99% 2.96% 2.90% 1.36%
Total observations 2,610 530 452 405 414 4,411
Proportional test (unconnected 
vs. strongest connection)
(0.000)***
Panel B: 
Municipality's share of votes 
compared to the total share of 
votes received by connected 
councilors within a regional 
cooperative
This table presents the results of a cross-tabulation of the strength of a municipality's political connections in relation to other municipalities belonging to the same
regional cooperative and a variable which measures whether an ABC service station store is opened in the municipality in the second calendar year following the
measurement of political connections. Panel A measures the strength of political connections by using the municipality's share of all connected municipal councilors
within the operating area of a regional cooperative. Panel B uses the share of votes received by the connected municipal councilors of the municipality of total share of
votes received by connected councilors within the operating area of regional cooperative. The municipalities are divided into the zero-group (unconnected) and
connected group based on their level of connections. The connected group is divided into quartiles that are not identical in size due to the nature of the data. The
sample includes only the ABC service station stores that are pure new investments. Municipalities are only included in the sample for those years for which information
on the respective S Group regional cooperative's members of the council of representatives is available. The p-values for a proportional test between the highest
quartile and the not connected group are presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A:
Municipality's share of the 
connected municipal 
councilors within a regional 
cooperative
Quartiles according to the level of connection
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Similar to when analyzing research question 1A, I also conduct the cross-tabulations by 
measuring the political connections with one- and three-year lags from the supposed 
openings of potential ABC service station stores, but the results are similar to Table 10. 
I also cross-tabulate the observations by excluding municipalities from the sample after 
an ABC service station store is opened in them, but the results remain essentially 
unchanged. The main finding from the cross-tabulation is that the likelihood of opening 
ABC service station stores seems to increase monotonically with the relative strength of 
political connections in relation to other municipalities in the operating area of the same 
regional cooperative. However, as discussed earlier, reliable conclusions cannot be 
drawn from the univariate analysis. I therefore next employ a multivariate Probit 
regression analysis to control for other factors that might be associated with the 
locations of ABC service station stores. 
Table 11 presents the results of regressions on the political connections and zoning 
decisions of ABC service station stores, when the municipality’s political connections 
are measured as a share of total connections of the regional cooperative. Since some of 
the regional cooperatives area more active in opening ABC service station stores than 
others, I include regional cooperative fixed effects to the regression models in addition 
to the year fixed effects. 
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Table 11 Regressions on zoning decisions 1B 
Expected 
effect
(I)
Coefficient
(I) 
Marginal effects 
(II) 
Coefficient
(II) 
Marginal effects 
(III)
Coefficient
(III) 
Marginal effects 
(IV) 
Coefficient
(IV) 
Marginal effects 
Dependent: ABC zoned
Political connection + 0.136 0.002 0.255 0.004 -0.106 -0.002 -0.014 -0.001
(0.36) (0.35) (0.53) (0.52) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.03) (-0.03)
Size of municipality + 0.389*** 0.006*** 0.490*** 0.007*** 0.408*** 0.006*** 0.510*** 0.007***
(6.15) (4.34) (7.31) (3.66) (7.23) (4.42) (8.44) (3.71)
Highway + 0.398** 0.005** 0.318 0.004* 0.390** 0.005** 0.311 0.004*
(2.03) (2.38) (1.51) (1.81) (2.00) (2.34) (1.48) (1.77)
Distance from ABC + 0.296*** 0.004** 0.290** 0.004**
(2.56) (2.20) (2.50) (2.15)
Intercept -6.382*** -10.769*** -6.540*** -10.867***
(-10.75) (-6.91) (-11.99) (-6.94)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional cooperative fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference probability
ABC zoned (N)
Observations
Pseudo R
2
3,931
0.185
0.017
48
2,755
0.227
3,931
0.186
0.017
48
2,755
0.228
This table presents the results of the Probit regression on the zoning decisions of ABC service station stores. All variables are measured at the municipal level. ABC zoned is a dummy variable which takes
the value of 1 if an ABC service station store is opened in a municipality in the second calendar year after the political connection is measured, and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, the political connection is
measured by using the following ratio: connected municipal councilors of the municipality divided by the total number of connected municipal councilors in the operating area of the respective regional
cooperative. The variable captures the level of political connections of a municipality in relation to other municipalities belonging to the same regional cooperative. In Panel B, the number of connected
councilors is replaced by the share of votes received by connected municipal councilors. Size of municipality is the natural logarithm of the population of the municipality. Highway is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the municipality is located along a highway, and 0 otherwise. Distance from ABC is the natural logarithm of the distance in metres from the municipality to the nearest municipality where
an ABC service station store is located. All independent variables are measured with a two calendar year lag from the potential opening of an ABC service station store. The sample covers only the ABC
service station stores that are pure new investments. Municipalities are only included in the sample for those years for which information on the respective S Group regional cooperative's members of the
council of representatives is available. Numbers in the parenthesis are robust t-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the municipality level. 
Panel B: Share of votesPanel A: Municipal council
0.015
60
0.015
60
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Similar to the cross-tabulation, in Panel A of Table 11 I measure the strength of political 
connections by using a municipality’s share of all connected municipal councilors 
within the operating area of the corresponding regional cooperative. Panel B uses the 
share of votes received by the connected municipal councilors of the municipality of the 
total share of votes received by connected councilors within the operating area of the 
same regional cooperative. The coefficient of the political connection variable is 
insignificant in both panels. This suggests that ABC service station stores are not more 
likely to be located in better-connected municipalities than in less-connected ones, even 
when the level of political connections is measured in relation to other municipalities 
belonging to the same regional cooperative. In Table 11, I measure the political 
connection with a two-year lag. Unreported regressions yield similar results when the 
connection is measured with a three-year lag and when an OLS regression is used as a 
robustness check.  
However, when a one-year lag is used, the coefficient of political connections becomes 
statistically significant (t-value = 2.58). The municipality’s share of the connected 
municipal councilors becomes significant in each of the regression specifications. It is 
noteworthy that the results are highly significant even though I adjust the standard 
errors for clustering at the municipality level and employ both time and regional 
cooperative fixed effects. The positive coefficient of the political connections variable 
suggests that ABC service station stores are more likely to be opened in municipalities, 
which have a higher share of the corresponding regional cooperative’s political 
connections. As discussed earlier, most of ABC service station stores for which I am 
able to detect the plan approval date are planned in the year preceding the opening of 
the station. Thus, this result gives weak support to the conclusion that the political 
connections of S Group would be positively associated with the zoning decisions of 
ABC service station stores. However, the connections measured with two- and three- 
year lags yield t-values that are far from being significant. Therefore, the significance of 
the one-year result is not robust and it seems more likely that this finding is a chance 
result. 
The statistical significance and signs of control variables are consistent with 
expectations, as well as the results from the preceding regression analysis regarding 
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research question 1A. Consistent with my earlier results the size of a municipality and a 
municipality’s location along a highway are positively associated with the likelihood 
that an ABC service station is opened in a municipality. The coefficient of the variable 
that measures the distance to the nearest municipality with an ABC service station store 
is also positive and significant.  
In conclusion, the results from the analysis of a municipality’s share of the total 
connections in the corresponding regional cooperative’s operating area do not support 
the conclusion that these political connections would have systemically affected the 
zoning decisions of ABC service station stores. Even though the results provide 
evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between the openings of ABC 
service station stores and political connections measured one calendar year before these 
events, the results from longer lags challenge the robustness of this finding.  
6.2 Quality of land 
In this subsection I aim to answer my second research question by analyzing the 
relationship between the political connections of S Group and the allocation of 
operating locations in the service station market. I first visualize the research 
environment with a graphical illustration, after which I report the results of cross-
tabulations and Probit regression analyses.  
Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of ABC service station stores by the quality of land 
and the proportion of connected municipal councilors measured at the municipal level. 
The sample includes the pure new investment ABC service station stores from the 
calendar year following their opening date. In Figure 7, the lines correspond to the 
average proportion of connected municipal councilors, whereas the bars illustrate the 
amount of ABC service station store municipalities in two different groups: (1) ABC 
service station store municipalities where the competitors are located in better operating 
areas than ABC service station stores on average (poorer land group) and 
(2) municipalities where ABC service station stores are located in better operating areas 
on average (better land group). I measure the quality of land by using the highest 
average daily traffic amount within a 500 meters radius of the units. In this analysis I 
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only include other service stations stores as competitors, as traffic amounts are unlikely 
to affect the location preferences of small grocery stores as strongly. 
Figure 7 Quality of operating areas and political connections 
 
The figure clearly shows that in each observation year ABC service station stores are 
located in better operating areas than their competitors on average. Moreover, the lines 
show that the average share of connected municipal councilors is higher in the 
municipalities in which ABC service station stores are located in better operating areas. 
Even though the figure seems to indicate that there is an association with the strength of 
political connections and the quality of land of ABC service station stores compared to 
their competitors, no conclusions on the causality of this relationship can be made. 
Several reasons might explain why ABC service station stores are located in better 
operating areas than competitors on average. First, operators of other service stations 
might simply not have been able to identify or have not had enough resources to occupy 
the best operating areas as efficiently as S Group. Second, it might be that the road 
network has later developed in a way that has been favorable to S Group’s locations. 
Third, it might be that the political connections of S Group have helped the group to get 
control over the better operating areas. The last explanation is supported by the higher 
level of political connections in municipalities in which the ABC service station stores 
are located in better operating areas.  
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Moreover, since the competitors used in this analysis mainly consist of units that existed 
before the opening of ABC service station stores, one might argue that comparing the 
locations of ABC service station stores to their competition is meaningless. This 
proposition is based on the logic that the operators, who have been the first to establish 
their stations in a municipality, have chosen their locations according to a different set 
of criteria than newer arrivals. Newer competitors, such as ABC service station stores, 
will have had stronger incentives to locate their new units in the best possible locations, 
while location might not have been as important a factor for existing service stations as 
they have entered into the market when the competition has been weaker. However, if 
political connections are related to the dominance of S Group in better operating areas, 
one might counter-argue that the competition has not had the same possibilities in 
choosing their initial locations as S Group. Thus, if different rules apply to S Group, 
then the locations of existing competitors are relevant in analysing the dominance of S 
Group. 
To investigate the matter further, several cross-tabulations are conducted. Table 12 
shows the results from the cross-tabulation of political connections with a two calendar 
year lag and a dummy variable that measures whether an ABC service station store is 
located in a better operating area than its competitors on average. The analysis is 
completed on a yearly basis and includes ABC service station stores from the calendar 
year following their establishment. Competitors include all the service station stores that 
are located in municipalities, where at least one ABC service station store is located. If 
several ABC service station stores are located in one municipality, the traffic amount is 
defined as the average traffic amount of all the ABC service station store units located 
in the municipality. 
When analyzing the connections to municipal councils in Table 12, I find that the 
proportion of ABC service station stores located in better operating areas is statistically 
significantly higher in the most connected quartile than in the unconnected group, but 
the relationship is not monotonic. The result holds both when measuring the relative 
number of connected municipal councilors and the share of votes received by the 
connected councilors. Since the analysis is done at the municipal level, the amount of 
observations is relatively low when analyzing connections in municipal boards and 
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committees. Therefore, instead of quartiles I only divide them into two groups: 
connected and unconnected. Only the connections to municipal boards seem to be 
statistically significant.  
I also conduct a cross-tabulation to investigate whether ABC service station stores are 
located in better operating areas than their competitors in the year following their 
establishment, but these results do not differ significantly from the results presented 
here. I also compare the traffic amounts of ABC service station stores to the competitor 
with the highest traffic amount in each municipality, but again essentially similar results 
are found. Overall, the analysis provides evidence that ABC service station stores are 
built in better operating areas than their competitors, and that new competitors are not 
able to obtain as good operating areas as ABCs are located in. Similar to the analysis on 
the relationship between political connections and the zoning of ABC service station 
stores, the cross-tabulations suggest that the mere existence of the connections is more 
strongly associated with this dominance than the specific strength of the connections. 
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Table 12 Cross-tabulation of quality of land and political connections 
 
Organ Strength of connection: Unconnected
Lowest 
connection 
(1
st
 quartile)
2
nd
3
rd
Strongest 
connection 
(4
th 
quartile)
Total 
connected
Total 
observations
ABC better land 38 31 17 33 29 110 148
% of total 80.9% 83.8% 70.8% 100.0% 100.0% 89.4% 87.1%
Total observations 47 37 24 33 29 123 170
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.136)
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.012)**
ABC better land 38 29 25 25 31 n/m 148
% of total 80.9% 87.9% 80.7% 89.3% 100.0% 87.1%
Total observations 47 33 31 28 31 n/m 170
Proportional test unconnected vs. strongest connection (0.010)***
Total 
unconnected
Total 
connected
Total 
observations
ABC better land 42 51 93
% of total 80.8% 94.4% 87.7%
Total observations 52 54 106
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.032)**
ABC better land 57 37 94
% of total 89.1% 86.1% 87.9%
Total observations 64 43 107
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.640)
ABC better land 52 42 94
% of total 83.9% 93.3% 87.9%
Total observations 62 45 107
Proportional test unconnected vs. connected (0.139)
Panel E:
Irrelevant committees
This table presents the results of cross-tabulation of the members of a municipal council (Panel A), municipal board (Panel C), committees relevant to building and zoning decisions (Panel D) and irrelevant
committees (Panel E), who are also representatives of S Group (connected) as a fraction of total members of the corresponding organs, and a variable which measures whether an ABC service station in the 
municipality is located in a better operating area than its competitors on average in the second calendar year following the measurement of connection. The share of votes received by connected municipal
councilors in municipal elections is used to measure the level of connection in Panel B. The municipalities are divided into the zero-group (unconnected) and connected group based on their level of
connections. The connected group is divided into quartiles that are not identical in size due to the nature of the data. The quality of land is measured by the highest average daily traffic amount within a radius
of 500 metres from the units. The sample includes only the ABC service station stores that are pure new investments. Municipalities are only included in the sample for those years for which information on
the respective S Group regional cooperative's members of the council of representatives is available. In Panels II, III and IV, the cross-tabulation for municipal board and relevant committees include only
the municipalities that have provided the information. P-values for proportional test between the connected and unonnected municipalities and for test between the highest quartile and the not connected
group are presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Quartiles according to the level of connection
Panel A:
Municipal council
Panel B: 
Share of municipality's votes 
received by connected 
councilors
Panel C:
Municipal board
Panel D:
Relevant committees
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Next, I employ Probit regression analysis to investigate the relationship between 
political connections and the allocation of operating locations to ABC service station 
stores. Table 13 presents the results of the regression analysis on the quality of land of 
ABC service station stores. Better land is a dummy variable that gets the value of 1 if an 
ABC service station store is located in a better operating area than its competitors on 
average. Differently to the cross-tabulation in Table 12, the regression analysis in Table 
13 is done by measuring the traffic amounts within a radius of one kilometer from the 
units. I use the longer radius since the cross-tabulation shows that in almost 90% of the 
observations, when the quality of land is measured by using the highest daily traffic 
amount within a radius of 500 meters from the units, an ABC service station store is 
located in a better operating area than competition. This low variation in the dependent 
variable and the small sample size are likely to affect the reliability of the results. 
Although the number of observations is essentially the same when using both radiuses, 
the number of analyzed competitors increases slightly since I am able to determine the 
traffic amount for more units when using the longer radius. For ABC service station 
stores the traffic amounts are essentially similar with both radiuses, since the units are 
mostly located within 500 metres from the highway.  
The results reported in Table 13 suggest that the political connections of S Group are 
not associated with the land allocation decisions of municipalities. The coefficients of 
the political connection dummies are insignificant in each of the regression 
specifications. In addition to analyzing the locations of competitors on average, in 
unreported regression specifications I also compare the traffic amounts of ABC service 
station stores to the competitor with the highest traffic amount, but the results are 
essentially similar to those presented here. The political connection dummies remain 
insignificant also when measuring the political connections with one- and three-year 
lags. 
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Table 13 Regressions on quality of land 
 
Similar to the previous regression analyses I also measure the political connections with 
one- and three-year lags but the results are essentially similar to those reported here. I 
also analyze whether the strength of the connections is associated with the quality of 
land. None of these analyses support the conclusion that the quality of operating areas 
of ABC service station stores would be associated with S Group’s political connections. 
I also run an OLS regression as a robustness check. The results from the OLS regression 
do not essentially differ from the results provided here. 
In conclusion, the analysis in this subsection does not support the view that the political 
connections of S Group would have affected the quality of land of the operating areas of 
ABC service station stores. ABC service station stores seem to be located in better 
operating areas measured by traffic amounts than their competitors, but the political 
Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects 
Dependent: Better land
Connected municipal council + 0.273 0.095
(0.70) (0.68)
Connected municipal board + 0.232 0.083
(0.49) (0.49)
Connected relevant committee + 0.056 0.020
(0.11) (0.11)
Connected irrelevant committee + 0.677 0.230
(1.43) (1.53)
Intercept 0.302 -0.122
(0.89) (-0.34)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reference probability 
ABC better land (N)
Observations
Pseudo R
2
0.079
Other organs
0.016
Municipal council
Expected 
effect
This table presents the results of the Probit regression on the quality of land of ABC service station store plots. All variables are
measured at the municipal level. The sample includes only the ABC service station stores that are pure new investments. Better
land is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if an ABC service station store is located in a better plot (as measured by
traffic amounts within a radius of one kilometer) than its competitors on average in the municipality in the second calendar year
following the measurement of political connections, and 0 otherwise. Political connections are measured by using a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one representative from S Group's regional cooperative's council of representatives,
board of directors or supervisory board is a member in municipal council, municipal board or comittees. Municipalities are only
included in the sample for those years for which information on the respective S Group regional cooperative's members of the
council of representatives is available. Numbers in the parenthesis are robust t-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. 
0.712
146
205
0.659
91
138
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connections of the group are not found to be associated with the creation of this 
dominance. 
6.3 Market share 
In this final part of my empirical analysis, I pursue to answer my third research question 
by analyzing the relationship between the political connections of the regional 
cooperatives and the level of competition within the small grocery stores and service 
station market. Table 14 presents the results of the regressions of political connection 
measures on the market share of ABC service station stores. In this regression, the 
dependent variable is the market share of ABC service station stores within the small 
grocery store and service station store markets. As defined earlier, market share is 
calculated using the number of employees as a proxy for the size of operations of the 
unit. I measure the political connections with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if at least one representative from the corresponding S Group's regional cooperative’s 
council of representatives, board of directors or supervisory board is a member of the 
municipality’s municipal council, municipal board or committees. Political connections 
are measured with a two-year lag, since the decisions of municipalities that would 
potentially have affected the market shares of single units must have been made before 
the observation year. For instance, zoning and land allocation decisions as well as road 
network changes affect competition with a lag. The sample includes only the 
municipalities in which at least one ABC service station store is located between 2001 
and 2009.  
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Table 14 Regressions on market share 
 
As can be seen from Table 14, the results do not support the conclusion that the political 
connections of S Group would have affected the market share of ABC service station 
stores. The political connection variables are insignificant in both regression 
specifications. These findings are in line with my previous results, which have indicated 
that political connections are not statistically significantly associated with the zoning 
decisions or the quality of land of the operating areas of ABC service station stores. As 
these two factors are the primary candidates for driving the market share of service 
stations stores, it is not surprising that political connections are not found to be 
associated with the market share either.  
Similar to the previous regression analyses I also measure the political connections with 
one- and three-year lags but the results are essentially similar to those reported here. I 
Expected 
effect
Municipal council Other organs
Dependent: Market share
Connected municipal council + -0.015
(-0.65)
Connected municipal board + -0.006
(-0.22)
Connected relevant committee + 0.014
(0.65)
Connected irrelevant committee + -0.033
(-1.19)
Size of municipality - -0.083*** -0.086***
(-6.52) (-4.26)
Constant 0.999*** 1.048***
(8.38) (4.87)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 408 264
R-squared 0.409 0.377
F-value 12.85*** 5.18***
This table presents the results of the OLS regression on the market share of ABC service station stores. All variables
are measured at the municipal level. Market share is the share of ABC service station(s)' employees of the total number
of employees of small grocery stores and service stations in the municipality. The total number of employees is
calculated using the employee classification of the Finnish business register. The political connections are measured with
a two-year lag. Political connections are measured by using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one
representative from S Group's regional cooperative's council of representatives, board of directors or supervisory board
is a member in the municipality's municipal council, municipal board or committees. Size of municipality is the natural
logarithm of the population of the municipality and it is also measured with a lag of two calendar years. Municipalities are 
only included in the sample for those years for which information on the respective S Group regional cooperative's
members of the council of representatives is available. Numbers in the parenthesis are robust t-values. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the municipality level. 
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also analyze whether the strength of the connections is related to the market share, but 
none of the analyses support the conclusion that the market shares of ABC service 
station stores are associated with S Group’s political connections.  
In the regressions I control for the sizes of the municipalities, since the competition in 
the service station and small grocery store market is likely to be higher in larger 
communities. The negative coefficient of the municipality size variable is in line with 
this expectation, and indicates that market share of the service station stores decreases 
with the municipality size. Similar to the political connections, the municipality size 
variable is measured with a lag of two years from measuring the market share. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I empirically analyze whether a politically connected firm that operates in 
a country with an established legal system and a low perceived level of corruption can 
benefit from its connections in the form of preferential access to land. More specifically, 
I examine the relationship between the political connections of Finland’s largest retail 
trade operator S Group and Finnish municipalities’ zoning decisions concerning its 
ABC service station stores. I also analyze whether the hypothesized favorable treatment 
of S Group in zoning decisions is associated with the market share of ABC service 
station stores.  
S Group and its ABC service station store network provide a particularly interesting 
research environment for several reasons. First, S Group’s operating structure is based 
on 21 regional cooperatives enabling a strong local presence, due to which the group 
can be expected to be particularly well-connected to municipal politics. Second, unit 
locations are widely considered as an important success driver of the service station 
store business. Third, the amount of units in the ABC service station store network has 
increased with a compound annual growth rate of 30% between 1999 and 2010, fueling 
a pronounced public debate over potential conflicts of interest in the zoning decisions of 
municipalities concerning the ABC service station stores. 
The sample used in the empirical analysis of this thesis consists of 64 ABC service 
station stores that have been pure new investments opened by S Group’s regional 
cooperatives. With some limitations the sample covers all the new investment ABC 
service station stores opened by the regional cooperatives between 1998 and 2010. As 
the zoning decisions concerning these units have been made before their opening due to 
the length of the planning and construction process, the hypothesized political 
connections of S Group are measured between 1996 and 2009. In my analysis, I define 
political connection as a dual role of a member of an S Group governance organ as a 
municipal politician. To identify the potential political connections of S Group, I collect 
and cross-reference the names of the members of the group’s governance organs and 
municipal politicians in the regional cooperatives’ operating areas, seeking exact 
matches of the first and last names. The political connections are used as a key 
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explanatory variable to explain the zoning decisions, quality of operating areas and 
market share of ABC service station stores. 
In addition to data on political connections, I collect three other datasets. First, I collect 
data on daily road traffic volumes to compare the quality of land of operating locations 
of ABC service station stores to competition. Second, I collect detailed establishment 
level information on all Finnish retail trade units to analyze the competitive situation 
and market shares in the service station store business. Third, I collect basic descriptive 
statistics on the municipalities to be used as control variables in the empirical regression 
models. The actual empirical analysis of this thesis is based on Probit and Ordinary 
Least Square regressions complemented with cross-tabulations and proportional tests. 
The first step in the empirical analysis is to determine the existence and the strength of 
the hypothesized connections of S Group to municipal politics during the examination 
period from 1996 to 2009. I find that the connections between the representatives of 
S Group’s regional cooperatives and municipal politics are widespread during the whole 
examination period. In 2009, over half of the representatives of the most connected 
regional cooperative, Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto, also acted as municipal councilors 
in the municipalities belonging to the operating area of the regional cooperative. 
Although Helsingin Osuuskauppa Elanto is by far the most connected of the regional 
cooperatives, all of the regional cooperatives are found to be connected to municipal 
councils. On average, every fourth representative of the regional cooperatives was also a 
municipal councilor in 2009.  
The second step in the analysis is to examine whether these widespread political 
connections have been related to the zoning decisions of ABC service station stores. I 
construct and run several statistical tests to examine whether an ABC service station 
store is more likely to be zoned and opened in a municipality where S Group’s political 
connections are stronger. The results do not support the conclusion that political 
connections of S Group have systemically affected the zoning decisions of ABC service 
station stores. I use various test specifications to measure the political connections of 
the group, and all results suggest that neither the mere existence nor the strength of the 
political connections is statistically significantly associated with the zoning decisions of 
ABC service station stores.  
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The third step of the analysis is to investigate whether S Group can utilize its political 
connections to gain access to better service station unit locations than its competition. I 
find that ABC service station stores are located in better operating areas than 
competition on average. However, this dominance is not found to be associated with the 
group’s political connections. My findings show that on average ABC service station 
stores are originally built in better operating areas than existing competitors. 
Furthermore, during each year after their establishment the locations of ABC service 
station stores on average remain to be better compared to competition. The results 
suggest that S Group has been able to obtain better locations than existing competitors, 
and that new competitors on average are not able to obtain better operating locations. 
The results hold both when analyzing the competitors’ locations on average, as well as 
when comparing ABC service station stores to the competing units that have the best 
locations of the relevant competitors. 
As the last step in the empirical analysis, I examine whether the hypothesized favorable 
treatment of S Group has translated into larger market shares of the group’s service 
station store units. This is achieved by analyzing whether ABC services station stores 
have higher market shares in municipalities where S Group’s political connections are 
stronger. Even though anecdotal propositions in the public discussion have suggested 
that smaller players would have been forced to withdraw from the competition due to 
S Group’s political ties, I find no support for these claims. As my earlier investigations 
do not support the view that political connections would have systematically affected 
the zoning decisions and quality of the locations of ABC service station stores – which 
are the means through which the market share mostly likely would be affected – this 
result is not surprising. My finding is also in line with Mäntylä et al. (2011), who 
suggest that ABC service station stores have not had major effects on the competition.  
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the results of my empirical analysis is that 
despite of the widespread existence of connections between S Group and municipal 
politics, it seems unlikely that the these connections would have systematically led to 
favorable treatment of the group in zoning and land allocation decisions. I neither find 
support for the proposition that ABC services station stores would systematically have 
higher market shares in municipalities where S Group’s political connections are 
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stronger. However, I do find support for that the control variables used in my analysis 
are statistically significantly associated with the expansion of the ABC service station 
store network as expected. I find that ABC service station stores are more likely to be 
located in larger municipalities and in municipalities which are located along highways. 
These results are consistent with Lähde (1999), who states that the local population and 
road network have a major effect on the placement decisions of service station stores. 
As expected, I also find that the structure of the existing ABC service station store 
network is statistically significantly associated with the decisions to open new stations. 
The fact that the control variables behave as expected increases confidence in the 
specifications of my statistical tests, and therefore also increases confidence in my main 
results. A limitation of the methodology employed in this thesis is that it focuses on the 
systemic nature of the phenomenon and thus it is unable to determine what role the 
political connections of S Group have had in single cases. Therefore, based on the 
results of my thesis no conclusions should be drawn on the effects that S Group’s 
political connections have had in specific zoning decisions or other specific situations.  
My results, which do not support the conclusion that S Group’s political connections 
have systemically been associated with the zoning decisions of ABC service station 
stores and the market power the chain has acquired, are in line with Mäntylä et al. 
(2011). They find that municipalities seem to be willing to support any parties that are 
willing to make significant investments, improve employment and widen the service 
offering of municipalities regardless of the political connections of these parties. 
Although my thesis is not able to answer the question whether S Group has been 
favored in the land allocation decisions, it suggests that the political connections of the 
group would not be the reason behind the potential favoritism. If the group has been 
favored, it can be hypothesized that factors behind this favoritism could be found from 
amongst the abovementioned indirect and direct effects of ABC service stations stores 
on the employment and service offering of municipalities. These factors are likely to be 
significant particularly for smaller municipalities. This view is also consistent with 
Schneider (1989), who states that one of the advantages that business interests have in 
land-use decisions is their perceived importance to local economies. Thus, it is possible 
that S Group has been favored in the zoning decisions due to its perceived importance to 
the municipalities’ economies.  
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The fast penetration of the ABC service station stores is a highly interesting 
phenomenon and offers room for further research. So far, the public discussion has 
mainly focused on explaining the fast penetration of the chain with the political 
connections of S Group. However, since my thesis does not provide evidence that 
would support the claims on the systematic favoritism of S Group in zoning decisions, it 
would be interesting to analyze other potential factors that relate to the fast penetration 
of the chain. An approach that combines both qualitative and quantitative methods 
would enable to analyze the topic from various complementary standpoints. For 
instance, it would be interesting to extend the research of Mäntylä et al. (2011) through 
a thorough comparison of the attitudes of unconnected and connected municipalities 
towards ABC service station stores, and examine whether the perceived importance of 
these service station stores to the local community systematically explains the zoning 
decision of the stores. 
Although in this thesis I am unable to find a significant relationship between political 
connections of S group and zoning decisions relevant to its operations, I am able to 
validate the existence of political connections during 1996 and 2009. These 
demonstrated political connections of the group bring up several interesting questions 
that can be analyzed further to contribute to the expanding flux of corporate governance 
related research on political connections of businesses. For instance, an interesting and 
yet untouched research topic would be to examine the relationship between the political 
connections and the locations of the state liquor monopoly’s Alko retail stores in 
connection with S Group’s and its competitors’ units.   
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APPENDIX 
Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Connected municipal councilors (%) 1
2. Connected municipal government members (%) 0.692 1
3. Connected relevant committee members (%) 0.458 0.237 1
4. Connected irrelevant committee members (%) 0.346 0.188 0.132 1
5. Municipal council connected 0.801 0.489 0.303 0.265 1
6. Municipal board connected 0.605 0.851 0.227 0.136 0.562 1
7. Relevant committee connected 0.361 0.207 0.147 0.928 0.303 0.16 1
8. Irrelevant committee connected 0.439 0.280 0.905 0.166 0.339 0.259 0.191 1
9. Share of votes received 0.903 0.623 0.344 0.254 0.769 0.541 0.270 0.343 1
10. Municipality's share of connected representatives 0.730 0.479 0.329 0.317 0.597 0.422 0.334 0.334 0.658 1
11. Municipality's share of votes 0.674 0.418 0.253 0.236 0.605 0.386 0.243 0.270 0.745 0.876 1
12. Size of municipality 0.428 0.372 0.198 0.250 0.454 0.386 0.306 0.221 0.338 0.367 0.223 1
13. Highway 0.152 0.132 0.149 0.150 0.179 0.173 0.161 0.158 0.089 0.172 0.088 0.486 1
14. Competition -0.247 -0.231 -0.134 -0.155 -0.282 -0.250 -0.194 -0.155 -0.176 -0.193 -0.100 -0.670 -0.381 1
15. Distance from ABC -0.029 -0.033 0.008 -0.013 -0.019 -0.004 -0.033 0.034 -0.036 0.048 0.027 -0.014 0.042 -0.199 1
16. Population density 0.313 0.244 0.103 0.197 0.258 0.221 0.249 0.079 0.236 0.264 0.146 0.628 0.212 -0.232 -0.293 1
This table presents the correlations between independent variables. All the variables are measured at the municipal level. The share of the members of municipal council, municipal board and
committees who are also representatives of S Group (connected), is used to measure the political connections (rows 1-4). Dummy variables that take the value of 1 if municipal council,
municipal board or committees are connected to S Group and 0 otherwise are also employed for measuring political connections (5-8). Share of votes received by the connected municipal
councilors measure the strength of political connections (9). A municipality's share of all connected municipal councilors and of the total share of votes received by the connected municipal
councilors within the operating area of a regional cooperative measure the municipality's share of the total connections within a regional cooperative (10-11). Size of municipality is the natural
logarithm of the population of the municipality. Highway is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the municipality is located along a highway and 0 otherwise. Competition is measured by
using the Herfindahl-index of small retail and service station markets. Distance from ABC is the natural logarithm of the distance in meters from the municipality to the nearest municipality with
an ABC  service station store. Population density is the natural logarithm of the population density of the municipality. 
